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Tutkimuksessa selvitetään WTO-jäsenyyden vaikutuksia 31 alueella sekä 41:llä eri teol-
lisuusalalla Kiinassa vuosina 2002–2007 laskettavan yleisen tasapainon mallin (CGE) 
avulla. Jos otetaan huomioon työvoiman liikkuminen Kiinan eri alueiden välillä, WTO-
jäsenyyden suora vaikutus on varsin pieni. Reaalinen BKT kasvaisi 6,5 % lyhyellä ja 5,6 % 
pitkällä aikavälillä. On kuitenkin huomattava, että rakenteellisten uudistusten ja WTO-
jäsenyyden vaikutus tuotantoon näyttäisi olevan varsin suuri varsinkin Kiinan rannikkoal-
ueilla. Työvoiman liikkuvuus kasvaisi 69 % rakenneuudistusten toteuttamisen jälkeen. Li-
säksi tulojakauman odotettaisiin tulevan tasaisemmaksi. 
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Using a CGE model (PRCGEM) updated to 2002, the paper explores how WTO member-
ship could affect earnings in 40 industries across 31 regions (and 8 regional blocks) of 
China during the period 2002–2007. Taking into account labour movement between re-
gions within China, the direct contribution of WTO membership to overall economic   
growth and development is predicted to be small, with a rise in real GDP of only 6.48% 
short term and 5.6% long term. However, structural economic change and the WTO shock 
should increase regional output, especially in the established coastal economies. Regional 
labour movement is found to increase 69.2% at the completion of economic structural re-
forms. A slight decrease in the Gini coefficient for income inequality is also anticipated. 
 
Keywords: Applied CGE modelling, China, WTO, labour movement, inequality 
JEL classification: C68, O18, R12, R23 
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1  Introduction: China’s WTO entry framework 
 
Any discussion of events since China’s formal accession to the WTO in December 2001 
should be prefaced with a mention that the country was also a founding GATT member in 
1947.
4 China’s WTO membership is essentially the outcome of negotiations launched in 
1982 to revive a lapsed trade status.  
Our paper examines the obligations and reciprocal benefits taken on by China as a 
result of its WTO membership. However, these WTO-inspired changes are occurring in the 
context of a lasting dynamic imparted to the Chinese economy by decades of expansion 
and liberalisation of trade. Indeed, even if WTO negotiations had failed, many of China’s 
trade barriers would have come down as numerous other agreements, particularly at the 
regional level, would have supplanted a stalled WTO membership process. 
From 1949 to 1978, China’s planned approach to foreign trade was closely man-
aged through 10–16 foreign trade corporations (Lardy, 1992). Conventional trade barriers 
such as tariffs, quotas and licences played little role in this administered regime (Huang 
and Chen, 1999a). China announced its “Open Door Policy” in 1978. By 1984, there was 
wide access to foreign exchange earnings from exports and the planned aspect of trade had 
been substantially reduced. In the 1990s, the Chinese gained broad opportunities to trade 
and invest in China on an open basis (Table 1 and Table 4). By the start of WTO accession 
in 2002, Chinese trade had developed to the point where it become possible to classify 
China’s trade barriers and incentives in conventional terms (even if a good proportion of 
imports was still coming from “privileged” sources). 
Our simulations assume China has five years to implement its WTO commitments
5 
and will meet most of its accession conditions by 2007 (foreign ownership and income 
payments have extended deadlines). Sectoral reforms include reductions in tariffs, com-
mitments not to raise tariffs across commodities and manufactures, and improved access 
for services. Average manufacture tariffs are presumed to fall from some 17% in 2002 to 
about 9% in 2005. Tariffs on automobiles and auto parts decline from 80%–100% before 
2001 to 25% in 2006. Quotas on other industrial products are eliminated by 2006, while 
tariffs on information technology equipment are progressively phased out. In the services 
                                                 
4 China’s membership was suspended in 1950. 
5 Upon joining the WTO in 2001, China is supposed to implement all the required WTO protocol by 2010. 
Most will be finished by 2007, especially the cutting of trade barriers. We assume the transition period for 
China’s WTO membership is 2002–2007. Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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sector,
6 the permitted foreign ownership share of China’s information technology and tele-
communication companies rises to at least 49%. Reforms are generally taken to boost FDI 
inflows in the short term. 
The first challenge here is distinguishing short-run shock adjustments from WTO 
accession effects – a non-trivial problem given that in the run-up to WTO accession, China 
floundered (although not as badly as other Asia economies, e.g. South Korea and Thailand) 
in the churn of the East Asia financial crisis throughout 1998 and the first half of 1999. 
China’s real GDP growth slowed a bit from 8.8% in 1997 to 7.1% in 1999. Chinese ex-
ports, after soaring 20.9% in 1997, rose only 0.5% in 1998. Export growth bounced back, 
hitting 22.3% in 2002, 34.6% in 2003 and 35.4% in 2004.
7 Foreign direct investment de-
clined 10% during 1997–2000. Chinese FDI inflows in 2002 increased 33.5% and contrac-
tual foreign investment 48% over the previous year. FDI inflows reached US$60.6 billion 
in 2003, making China the world’s top FDI destination. 
A start perhaps is to choose a plausible baseline with sustainable growth rates. 
China took a quarter of a century to establish itself as a major trading power. Between 
1979 and 2003 Chinese exports grew from $13.7 billion to $438.2 billion, while imports 
grew from $15.7 billion to $412.8 billion. In 2003, however, the growth in trade was 
steeper than the trend – exports were up 34.6% and imports 39.8% on year. During the pe-
riod 1990–2003, China’s share of world exports increased from 1.8% to 5.84%, making it 
the world’s fourth largest exporter (after Germany, Japan and the US) and third largest im-
porter (after the US and Germany). China also ran trade surpluses in the six years preced-
ing 2003, when the trade surplus was $25.47 billion. Merchandise trade surpluses and 
large-scale foreign investment have enabled China to accumulate massive foreign ex-
change reserves ($286.4 billion in 2002 and $403.2 billion in 2003). Somewhat to the as-
tonishment of China’s critics, China’s accession to the WTO has proceeded quite 
smoothly. A recent World Bank report
8 estimates that if the trend continues China’s share 
of world trade would increase from 3.0% in 1992 to 9.8% in 2020, making China the 
world’s second largest trading economy after the US. 
                                                 
6 Under the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), trade in services as the supply of a service 
can be treated with four models: Cross-Border Supply, Consumption Abroad, Commercial Presence (FDI), 
and Movement of Individuals (Mattoo, 2002). 
7 China’s imports increased at a fairly steady rate in the years up to 2004, when the trade surplus hit US$32 
billion, an increase of 25.3% from 2003 (China Statistical Yearbook, various volumes).  
8 China Engaged: Integration with the Global Economy (1997), World Bank, p. 31. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss trade liberalisation and 
sectoral/regional inequality. Section 3 surveys recent CGE studies on the impacts of WTO 
membership on income inequality in China. Section 4 provides a rough description of the 
CGE model of China (PRCGEM). Section 5 presents our database, baseline and simulation 
scenarios. Section 6 describes the simulation results at macro, sectoral and regional levels. 
Section 7 deals with policy implications suggested by the analysis. 
 
 
2  Trade liberalisation with sectoral/regional inequality  
2.1  Trade patterns 
 
China’s agricultural sector employs a large share of the workforce, yet its per capita output 
has remained modest.
9 China’s trade pattern in agricultural commodities generally follows 
its comparative advantage: China tends to import land-intensive commodities (e.g. grains, 
especially in the 1990s) and export labour-intensive agricultural commodities (e.g. fish, 
fruits, vegetables and processed agricultural goods). 
Trade within the agricultural sector is managed by a complex institutional and pol-
icy regime, with non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
10 playing an important role in China’s agricul-
tural trade policies. Among its non-tariff barrier commitments, China has promised to re-
duce or eliminate the monopoly of state trading companies, as well as replace the current 
import quota and licensing system with a tariff-rate quota system. Trade in major grains, 
however, continues to be handled exclusively by state-owned trading organisations. 
Domestic demand is satisfied by the allocation of import quotas. This is a major is-
sue for the Chinese, since accession has seen the increase of agricultural imports at undis-
torted market prices
11 and reductions in government import quotas. WTO membership is 
expected to facilitate imports of resource-intensive products such as wheat, rice, cotton and 
soybeans, as well as the export of more labour-intensive products such as fruits, vegeta-
bles, livestock and aquaculture products. 
 
                                                 
9 The agricultural sector accounted for over 55% of total employment in 1997, yet its overall contribution to 
value-added was only about 22% (Table 2 in Hertel et al., 2002). 
10 The most important non-tariff barriers in agriculture are quotas, import licences and the use of state trading 
companies. 
11 The share of agricultural goods sold at state-fixed prices declined from 94% in 1978 to around 17% in 
1995 (Ianchovichina et al., 2000b, Table 1). Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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In recent years, China has vigorously built on its comparative advantage in light manufac-
turing (e.g. textiles and garments, toys, consumer electrical appliances and consumer elec-
tronic products). The share of manufacturing in total employment in 1997 was still rela-
tively small (only about 18%), but already then it made a disproportionately large value-
added contribution (33%). Textiles and clothing, electronics and chemicals led the way. 
The global market continues to provide China with opportunities to diversify ex-
ports. During the period 1994–2000, the share of the exports coming from the Electrical 
Machinery, Consumer Electrical and Electronic Products categories rose from 16.3% to 
29.3%, while share of exports from the Textiles and Garments category fell from 28.3% to 
19.8% (Table 2). The phase-out of textile quotas has also helped boost exports of textiles 
and garments dramatically. Much of the significant growth in manufacturing has appar-
ently been driven by exports and tariff exemptions for imported intermediate inputs used in 
the production of export goods. 
China’s effective tariff collection rate in 1995 was 5.6%, a figure well below the 
trade-weighted average tariff of 32% (World Bank, 1994). By 1997, the effective collec-
tion rate for Agriculture and Manufacturing Sectors was 3.48%, compared to an un-
weighted average tariff of 13.72% (China I/O Data, 1997). 
An abundance of cheap labour has made China internationally competitive in low-
cost, labour-intensive manufactures. Not surprisingly, manufactured products comprise an 
increasingly large share of China’s trade. The share of Chinese manufactured exports to 
total exports rose from 50% in 1980 to 92% in 2000, while manufactured imports as a 
share of total imports rose from 65% to 82%. A large share of China’s manufactured im-
ports are intermediates (e.g., chemicals, electronic components and textile machinery) used 
in manufacturing products in China.  
 
In 2000, the leading Chinese imports were:  
•  electrical machinery, equipment and related products,  
•  mineral fuels and related materials, 
•  base metals and related products, 
•  chemicals and related products, 
•  textile materials and products, and  
•  plastics and related products. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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The leading exports in 2000 were:  
•  electrical machinery, equipment and parts, 
•  textile materials and products, 
•  base metals and related products, 
•  footwear and related products, 
•  chemicals and related products, and 
•  mineral fuels and related products. 
 
Intra- and inter-industry trade have developed since China’s WTO accession. China is a net 
importer of skilled- labour-intensive and capital-intensive manufacturing products and a 
net exporter of unskilled-labour-intensive manufacturing products. 
Liberalisation of imports and the opening up of the service sector in China is ex-
pected to pressure the economy to rationalise and restructure, particularly in the case of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
12 The share of services in total employment in 1997 was 
around 27% and its contribution to economy-wide value-added was about 45%. 
As China’s economy has shifted from an economy based on import substitution to 
an export-oriented economy, it has also developed a highly competitive labour-intensive, 
export-oriented manufacturing sector dominated by foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs).
13 
Simultaneously, China maintains a fairly traditional capital-intensive industrial sector 
dominated by SOEs, as well as an agricultural sector that enjoys a relatively high degree of 
government support and tariff/non-tariff protection (UNCTAD, 2002). 
The penetration of imported goods and services in the form of FDI is expected to 
increase competition on domestic markets and the use of modern technology. This trend 
should encourage local industries to improve efficiency and productivity, even if it in-
volves extensive restructuring, labour-shedding and adjustment problems. Chinese con-
                                                 
12 SOEs, generally recognised for their low productivity, inefficient production with outdated facilities and 
technology, employment excesses and high inventory levels, account for about half of China’s exports. Even 
so, most sales are, on balance, directed at domestic markets. SOEs still dominate heavy industries such as 
power, steel, chemicals and armaments and services such as banking, telecommunications, wholesale distri-
bution and certain transport activities. SOEs accounted for 12% of total employment and 47% of manufactur-
ing-sector employment in the late 1990s (China Statistical Yearbook 2000). 
13  FFEs (mostly owned by investors from East Asia) include equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises and joint exploration companies for certain extractive industries. FFEs 
already dominate several light industries, including footwear, garments and toys.  Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
 
Effects of WTO membership on income distribution 




  12 
sumers, in turn, expect a transparent, market-driven economic system will deliver an abun-
dant variety of affordable goods.  
 
2.2  Lowering barriers 
 
China cut tariffs seven times between 1992 and 2001, lowering the unweighted import tar-
iff level from 43.2% to around 15.3%.
14 In 2002, China further lowered tariff rates on 
53,000 items, about 73% of all items subject to tariffs. This cut the unweighted average 
tariff to 12% at the end of 2002. The average tariff in 2004 was 10.4%. 
Many non-tariff measures such as import and export licensing, price controls, sub-
sidies, quotas and tendering have been modified. Between 1992 and 1997, China reduced 
the number of products subject to import quotas, licences administration and import con-
trols fell from 1,247 to 385.
15 
China introduced in 1996 tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on certain products and tariff 
rates applicable to imports both in and out of quota. TRQs have been widely applied to ag-
ricultural goods. Liberalisation of agricultural products in accordance with its WTO com-
mitments is expected to a major impact key agricultural exporters such as the US, Argen-
tina and Canada. The country has also made considerable progress in freeing agricultural 
commodities from state pricing and in guiding farmers to adjust the structure of agricul-
tural production based on the demands of the market. Under its WTO protocol, China 
agreed to establish an efficient TRQ system for imports of agricultural bulk commodities 
(e.g. wheat, corn, cotton, barley and rice) during 2002–2004, whereby imports up to a 
specified quota level would be assessed a low tariff (1–3%) and imports above a certain 
level would be subject to a high tariff.  
While China officially abolished direct subsidies for exports on January 1, 1991, 
many manufactured exports in China still receive indirect subsidies through guaranteed 
provision of energy, raw materials or labour supplies, or in the form of not-to-be-repaid or 
long-term bank loans at low interest rates. The value-added tax (VAT), introduced in the 
early 1990s, has recently been put to use as a quasi-subsidy tool. Tax rebates and duty ex-
emptions on imported inputs for export production are provided to exporters, while com-
                                                 
14 Xinhua, Dec. 29, 2000, (http://www.china.org.cn/english/2000/Dec/5896.htm) 
15 Deregulation Report 1997 – China (APEC) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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modities (imported or domestic produced) bound for the domestic market are subject to a 
high VAT rate. 
Due to the limited and unreliable data sources and methodology, quantitative esti-
mates of the impact of non-trade barriers in China are rarely attempted. According to the 
Pacific Economic Co-Operation Council (1995), NTB equivalents during 1984–1987, 
1988–1990 and 1991–1993, were 10.6% (17.8% for primary products and 7.9% for manu-
factured goods), 23.2% (27.2 for primary products and 21.9% for manufactured goods) and 
11.3% (11.5% for primary products and 11.3% for manufactured goods), respectively. 
Zhang et al. (1998) put the total average 1994 tariff equivalents of China’s NTBs at 22.1%, 
with 30% of all imports enjoying highest protection. Li and Zhai (2000) decompose the 
difference between the domestic price and world undistorted price into the tariff rate and 
non-tariff barrier equivalent. Their calculated unweighted NTB equivalents for manufac-
tured products are 13.03% for 1995. Li and Lejour (2000) estimate the NTB equivalent as 
suggested by Hoekman (1995) averaged 3.3% in 1997. Wang (2001b) calculates the NTB 
equivalents for China at 9.6% in total trade average for 1997 using the difference between 
import protection rate in the version-five GTAP database and China’s tariff after adjust-
ment for duty exemptions. Given the wide range of estimates to draw on, any quantitative 
analysis of China’s NTBs should be approached with great caution. We use the last two 
sets of estimates. 
China’s service sector remains heavily regulated and sheltered from competition. It 
remains relatively underdeveloped and foreign participation has been minimal until quite 
recently. NTBs still abound in the service sector, and many service industries (e.g. basic 
telecommunications, banking and insurance) remain government monopolies.
16 
When China joined the WTO, banking and finance, foreign financial institutions 
were prohibited from doing local-currency business with Chinese enterprises and stringent 
geographic restrictions were imposed on the establishment of foreign banks. By 2007, all 
geographic and customer restrictions should be lifted. 
China has actively awarded licences to foreign insurers in both the life and non-life 
sectors in recent years. Although all geographic and ownership restrictions should be lifted 
by 2007, we prudently assume that only half of NTBs will actually be gone by then. 
 
                                                 
16 China earlier prohibited all foreign ownership in telecoms, but at WTO accession, foreign-held stakes of up 
to 25-30% were allowed in some cities. Foreigners presently may own up to 49% of a telecom. Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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2.3  Regional industry structures 
 
The economic reforms introduced in 1978 were designed to correct the structural imbal-
ance that resulted from the 1949 policy of rapid, state-directed industrialisation that em-
phasised development of steel and defence-related industries. During 1979–2001, reforms 
radically altered the output structure across regions. 
China’s manufacturing base is located mostly in seven regions. The North-Eastern 
Region (which includes the Liaoning province) is China’s oldest and most industrialised 
region. Its diversified resource base supports petroleum refining, coal mining, iron and 
steel, chemical and timber industries. The Northern Region (Inner Mongolia) is a relatively 
new industrial region. The Beijing-Tianjin industrial belt is a coal-mining district produc-
ing iron and steel, machinery, chemicals and textiles. The Eastern Region is an old indus-
trial region centred in Shanghai. The South-Central Region has well-developed food-
processing and handicraft industries. The North-Western Region (Shananxi and Gansu 
provinces), the newest industrial region, is heavily involved in petroleum refining, as well 
as the petrochemical, iron and steel, and cotton textile industries. The South-Western Re-
gion (Sichuang, Yunnan, and Chongqing provinces) is the country’s principal producer of 
non-ferrous metals. 
The Guangdong province by itself accounts for more than a third of total trade, fol-
lowed by Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu. The output of the regions along the sea is domi-
nated by secondary industry (more than 50%) and tertiary industry (over 30%) (see Table 
3). 
This diversity suggests that implementation of China’s WTO commitments will 
have different impacts across regions. Indeed, the uneven impacts of WTO membership are 
already manifested in rapid growth rates in some regions facilitated by restraints on spill-
over to other regions and industries. Where possible we try to take such distortionary ef-
fects into account in our simulations. 
Assessing the impact of trade liberalisation is highly problematic. There appears to 
be a considerable discrepancy between the restrictions nominally in place and the effective 
level of trade restrictions. In computing the impact of liberalisation, we must therefore 
tackle both the traditional problem of determining the tariff equivalent of quantitative re-
strictions (Li and Lejour, 2000) and the task of defining an appropriate level for actual bar-
riers. China’s Customs reported that 40% of imports in 1995 were ordinary imports with-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/ 2005 
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out duty exemptions/drawbacks.
17 Further, the GTAP Database 4 for 1995 (McDougall et 
al., 1998), shows 14% of imports were for final consumption. From these figures, we de-
duce that about 26% of imports were used as intermediates. The GTAP Database 4 puts 
China’s exports at around 10% of its output, which implies that around 3% of imports are 
used for the production of ordinary exports (Ianchovichina and Martin, 2002). Lejour 
(2000), for example, finds a considerable effect from modelling duty exemptions explic-
itly. Failure to account for duty exemptions/drawbacks in the case of China’s WTO mem-
bership overstates impacts for exports, welfare, output, etc. (Ianchovichina and Martin, 
2001). Without full liberalisation, deep duty exemptions for imported intermediate inputs 
and high trade barriers (tariff/non-tariff) may disadvantage industries that rely on domestic 
value-added rather than imported intermediate inputs. 
 
 
3  CGE models of China 
 
We draw on a number of studies of trade liberalisation with China. Most employ comput-
able general equilibrium (CGE) models
18 such as GTAP (Yang, 1996 and Hertel, 1997), 
MEGABARE (Mai et al., 1998), G-CUBED World Model (McKibbin and Tang, 1998), 
PRCGEM (Fan and Zheng, 2000, Mai et al., 2003, Mayes and Wang, 2003) or other pur-
pose-built models (Wang and Li, 1998 and Zhai and Li, 2000).
19 In the main, these models 
are used to get an idea of longer-term impacts rather than establish a year-to-year trajec-
tory. Almost all simulation results suggest China and its major trading partners (the US, 
EU, Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong) gain from China’s accession (McKibbin and Tang, 
1998, Ianchovichina et al., 2000a and Wang, 2001). Not surprisingly, the results also sug-
gest that China (including Hong Kong, Taiwan) will be the biggest beneficiary. Wang and 
                                                 
17 Duty exemption/drawback is used as means of providing exporters with imported inputs at world prices or 
with a very low tariff. The host country, in turn, can increase its competitiveness in the world market while 
shielding its own producers against competition from the rest of the world. 
18  CGE models are widely used for policy analysis. They have an advantage over other models (e.g. partial 
equilibrium models) in policy analysis when there is a need to consider links between producing sectors, 
links between macro and micro levels, and the disaggregated impact of changes in policies and exogenous 
shocks (tariff reductions, technological progress, etc.) on sectoral structure, household welfare (equivalent 
variation), investment allocation and income distribution. 
19  For more China’s trade liberalisation, see Gilbert and Wahl (2002). For single-country recursive dynamic 
CGE models, see Adams et al. (1994) and Dixon and Rimmer (2001) with respect to the MONASH model 
and Hertel et al. (2002) for the DRC-CGE Model. For multi-region recursive dynamic CGE models, see Ian-Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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Schuh (1998), for example, predict a net welfare gain of about $47.5 billion, or 5.3% of 
GDP in 1997 prices in the steady-state with capital market adjustment. Gilbert and Wahl 
(2002) show accession has no impact on the overall level of employment in China, but 
rather induces inter-sectoral shifts in employment and output in their CGE models (and 
particularly GTAP). 
Table A summarises some the macro-economic estimates of the impact of China’s 
WTO membership from a range of studies using CGE models. Due to different simulations 
under different assumptions and policy alternatives, the results are largely different. Re-
sults in multi-country CGE models tend to be larger than those in single-country models 
(possibly due to a consideration of feedback from the rest of the world). In any case, under 
the same framework (single- or multi-country CGE), there remain large differences in out-
comes caused by different considerations of CGE structure under diverse labour-market 
assumptions with different baselines. These analyses find that China’s WTO accession is 
welfare-enhancing and good for economic growth and trade, adding about 1.2% to GDP 
growth. Tariff reductions are also expected to lower import prices. As China’s investment 
goods are import-intensive, the price of capital creation falls. This results in a higher rate 
of return on capital in China, so investment and capital increase. 
A notable outcome is that growth of real investment outstrips consumption growth. 
This could be partly explained by the uneven income distribution effects from trade liber-
alisation. Savings are channelled into investment, adding to employment and income.
20 
However, since this process involves both trade and financial liberalisation, the terms of 






                                                                                                                                                    
chovichina et al. (2000b). See Bovenberg and Goulder (1991) and Baldwin and Forslid (1999) for discus-
sions of growth features in CGE models.  
20 While the evidence suggests Chinese savings have risen over time, there is no clear picture of how Chinese 
savers will behave once the country’s WTO commitments are fully met. A flexible exchange-rate regime, for 
example, could help minimise disruptions from changes in the savings rate so as to achieve the transforma-
tion from current account surplus and capital inflow to current account deficit and capital inflow. On July 21, 
2005, Chinese monetary authorities abandoned their long-standing US dollar peg for a sliding peg that allows 
the renminbi to fluctuate within a band of ± 0.3% against a basket of currencies.    Table A. Selected macro effects of China’s WTO membership (cumulative effects from baseline), % 
 
 GDP  Welfare
a Household  con-
sumption 
Investment  Exports  Imports  Term of trade  Real exchange 
rate 
Single-Country Model                
Wang and Li (1998)  1.53 1.24
b 0.58  1.75  26.93  25.79  -1.57  1.85 
Fan and Zheng (2000)
 c   0.06(0.62)   0.06(0.62)  0.00(1.59)  5.73(5.54) 7.26(9.05)  -1.84(-1.78)  3.34(2.79) 
Li and Lejour (2000)  0.8 4.0  0.3  2.4  1.7  1.9    0.5 
Li and Zhai (2000)  1.53 1.24
 b 0.58  1.75  26.93  25.79  -1.57  1.85 
Zhai and Li (2000)  1.1 0.86
 d  1.05  0.81  17.13  16.75  -1.07  -0.27 
Zhai and Wang (2002)
 d  1.09(2.45) 0.97(2.27)
 d  0.95(1.28)  1.27(4.31)  10.73(13.32) 10.94(13.56)  -0.73(-0.90)   
Diao et al. (2003)  0.73   0.81          4.79 
Jiang (2003)
 e  0.56(0.54) 63.69(48.04)
 f 1.04(0.67)
 g -1.22(3.84)     -0.46(-0.47)  0.00(5.45)
 h 
Mai (2003)
 i  1.95(0.96)   1.95(0.96)  2.31(1.98)  8.94(6.31) 10.47(8.86)    1.13(1.66) 
Mai et al. (2003)  10.7   10.7  11.6  11.2  12.0     
Multi-Country Model                
Yang (1996)  7.7       81.2  119.1 -12.2   
Wang (2001)  2.85 188.1      54.05  31.12  -5.66   
Francois and Spinanger (2002)  5.80       23.08       
Hertel et al. (2002)  0.64 0.69
 j 1.17  0.32  15.32  14.55     
Rees and Tyers (2004)
 k  0.42(0.28)   0.12(-1.37)  0.98(0.97)      -0.85(-1.12) -1.03(-1.59) 
Walmsley et al. (2004)
 l  4.26(1.57) 10.52(3.91)    6.08(0.72)
 m 17.59(13.73)  16.72(13.41)    
  
 Note: 
a US$ billion.    
b % of GDP. 
c Results outside the parenthesis are static short-run gains associated with factor reallocation efficiency; those in parenthesis include both static and growth effects. 
d Results in parenthesis consider a complete labour market reform. 
e Results in parenthesis were not controlled for trade balance. 
f RMB billion. 
g Average household consumption of rural and urban households. 
h Nominal exchange rate. 
i Results in parenthesis do not consider endogenous productivity improvement. 
j % in equivalent variation (EV). 
k The results outside (inside) the parenthesis are short-run results under fiscal policy with no tax revenue switch (with tax revenue switch via an increase in the direct tax rate), when capital 
controls are ineffective. 
l The results outside the parenthesis are China’s accession with lump-sum replacement; those inside are tax revenue replacement. 
m Capital stock. 
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The diverging trend in regional development is the result of profound structural changes in 
China’s economy. Empirical studies addressing the issue of regional disparity and its de-
terminants in China (Jian et al., 1996, Naughton, 1999, Kanbur and Zhang, 2004) suggest 
that the evolution of inequality coincides with political and economic events in China and 
globalisation processes (particularly since WTO membership). However, the existing lit-
erature provides no clear evidence as to how foreign trade expansion has affected regional 
development since WTO accession. Moreover, CGE research to date on China’s WTO 
membership demonstrates overall welfare gains by sectors without considering how such 
gains might be distributed.  
In addition to considering the complexity of China’s economic structure and ad-
justments from WTO membership, it could also be worthwhile to distinguish regional im-
pacts within China to get a fuller picture of the impact of China’s accession. Data prob-
lems,
21 of course, have long dampened the enthusiasm of researchers to attempt CGE stud-
ies of the regional situation, but several brave efforts deserve mention (Yang and Huang, 
1997, Fan and Zheng,
22 2000, Diao et al., 2002, 2003, Jiang,
23 2003). 
Estimating the response of investment and its impact on location of an activity is a 
non-trivial problem. Moreover, as the new economic geography (Fujita et al., 1999) indi-
cates, the attractions of agglomeration and the sheer size of China’s markets tend to en-
courage expansion of foreign firms in the direction of local production. 
We note several successes in tackling these problems. Walmsley et al. (2004) use a 
GTAP-Dynamic Model
24 to analyse the impact of China’s WTO accession on foreign in-
vestment. They find that accession doubles the extent of foreign ownership of China’s as-
sets in 2020 relative to a non-accession baseline. Not surprisingly, this has a substantial 
impact, increasing the total welfare of China by as much as $125 billion in 2020. Using a 
dynamic approach enables an assessment of the costs of adjustment. The authors suggest 
that the short-term costs of trade liberalisation for highly protected goods industries will be 
                                                 
21 It is difficult to get detailed regional I/O table, income, consumption and trade data for China. Moreover, 
inter-regional flows of products and factors are treated differently than in a global model as there are no cus-
toms data that might be used to track imports/exports between regions within China. 
22 In their top-down PRCGEM, sectors are classified into local and national sectors. Local sectors produce 
products that are not tradable between regions, while national sectors can produce tradable products. It is 
further assumed that the same percentage change in sectoral output applies to all regions within China. 
Hence, the differences in regional responses to the WTO accession are similar to structural changes. 
23 This model uses the “bottom-up” approach to model each region (28 provinces in total) within China as an 
open economy with its own agents and behavioural functions. Labour mobility across regions is allowed, 
while assuming perfect mobility of capital cross domestic region sand sectors. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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significant both in terms of lost domestic output and lost jobs, while the long-term benefits 
of trade liberalisation will be sufficient to make up for any short-term losses (Zhang et al., 
1998). 
CGE models with micro-simulations have been applied to study income distribu-
tion.
25 Wage inequality between skilled and low-skilled workers is the outcome of the in-
teraction of supply of skills (education), demand of skills (e.g. skill-biased technology 
which can come from the effect of FDI) and wage-setting factors (e.g. labour-market insti-
tutions, union coverage) (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2002). In China’s case, institutional 
segmentation in the labour market (the Hukou household system
26) and high labour mobil-
ity costs force foreign investors to pay a higher wage to attract the skilled labour from Chi-
nese employers (SOEs). Thus, the costs of skilled labour push up the total average wage 
even without bringing in skill-biased technology. 
CGE models can quantify income distribution effects in two ways. The first ap-
proach (Ricardian) describes them in terms of returns to factors of production. The second 
way is to model more than one household explicitly (e.g. peasant and non-peasant house-
holds in PRCGEM) as performed by Yang and Huang
27 (1997a), Wang and Zhai
28 (1998) 
and Li and Zhai (2000). 
                                                                                                                                                    
24 Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001). 
25 See e.g. the CGE study of Tongeren (1994) on Dutch firms, Cogneau (1999) on a city of Antananarivo, 
and Cogneau and Robillard (2000) on a national model of Madagascar. They find that the neglect of general 
equilibrium effects in standard micro-simulations under the assumption of a fixed intra-group income distri-
bution can strongly bias results.  
26 The Hukou system was established in cities in 1951 and extended to the rural areas in 1955. It establishes a 
tight relationship between place of residence and access to consumer goods, employment opportunities and 
social benefits. It consists of agricultural registration by rural residents and non-agricultural registration by 
urban residents. Social welfare for non-agricultural Hukou-holders is much better than for rural residents, and 
urban sectors must consider non-agricultural Hukou-holders first. This discourages rural-urban labour 
movement in the labour market. Despite significant modifications since the early 1980s, the Hukou system 
remains firmly in place today. For details, see Chan and Zhang (1999). 
27 Yang and Huang (1997a) tackle the income distribution of China systematically with a single country CGE 
comparative-static model. They consider a 30% reduction in the overall tariff and a similar reduction in the 
agricultural tariff only. Their results show that comprehensive trade liberalisation leads to a Pareto improve-
ment in China. Consequently, income inequality in both rural-urban and rural income distribution diminishes. 
If only agricultural liberalisation is undertaken, poorer rural households are worse off, while the overall eco-
nomic situation improves. If only industrial liberalisation is undertaken, both rural-urban equality and rural 
income distribution narrow, while urban income distribution becomes more inequitable. The paper only con-
siders trade liberalisation (not investment liberalisation) and results are solely focused on the national level. 
Moreover, the model does not account for tax replacement. 
28 Tax replacement is introduced in the seminal paper of Wang and Zhai (1998). Their simulations assume 
the level of government revenue is maintained by endogenous adjustment of various taxes. Their results indi-
cate both increased economic efficiency and improved income equality as a result of trade liberalisation, both 
in terms of factor payments and household incomes. They emphasise that increases in income disparity are 
not a necessary outcome of China’s trade liberalisation and can be avoided by appropriate adjustment of the 
domestic tax structure. Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
 
Effects of WTO membership on income distribution 




  20 
 
4  Basic model structure 
 
We study the effects of trade policies in China after accession using an updated PRCGEM 
model
29 with an updated database (2002 Regional/National I/O Table). PRCGEM is a con-
ventional single-country comparative static model that assumes perfectly competitive con-
stant-returns-to-scale production.
30 The model distinguishes 40 sectors, 31 provinces, 2 
occupations and 2 household types. Its theoretical structure follows the Australian ORANI-
F model (Horridge et al., 1993), and is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 
1996). We apply the PRCGEM model first to tariff liberalisation, and then, after minor 
modifications, use it to capture the major features and impacts of non-tariff equivalent lib-
eralisation in China’s current economy. Finally, the original PRCGEM is again adjusted to 
separate China’s trade regimes into an ordinary trade regime and a processing trade re-
gime.
31 A small duty exemption mechanism is introduced. 
This section summarises the PRCGEM’s main features. A more detailed descrip-
tion is found in Appendix I. 
An important feature of this single-country multi-regional CGE model is the ex-
plicit treatment of two trading regimes (EOPEs
32 and DOPEs
33). EOPEs grew rapidly in 
the 1990s, eventually accounting for more than half of total trade. Considering the different 
characters and behaviour of trade between EOPEs and DOPEs, it is critical to give an ex-
plicit treatment to this dual trade regime in the CGE model. 
PRCGEM considers 31 regions, each with a demand structure and foreign trade in 
commodities and services. The inter-regional input/output (I/O) is also embedded. Produc-
                                                 
29 This updated PRCGEM is an extension of the original PRCGEM used in China’s WTO accession study 
(Fan and Zheng, 2000). Some significant modifications are introduced to capture major features of foreign 
trade/investment with regional extension. For simplicity, we keep the name PRCGEM. 
30 Some of the available dynamic features were not used in these simulations. 
31 China had developed two trading regimes by 1987. The new regime, export processing, was extremely 
open. Most foreign-invested firms and some domestic firms participated in it. The second was the traditional 
trade regime. Export processing expanded rapidly; by 1995, it accounted for over 50% of all Chinese exports 
(Naughton, 1996). 
32 Export-Oriented Processing Enterprises (EOPEs) produce exclusively for export markets using imported 
intermediates that are either exempt from duties or eligible for a refund on the import tax paid. “Ordinary” 
exports outside the EOPEs are produced exclusively with domestic inputs. In actuality, complex administra-
tive rules strongly discourage EOPEs from selling domestically. Ianchovichina (2004) shows that in 1995 
approximately less than 3% of intermediate imports were used for the production of ordinary exports. 
33 Domestic-Oriented Processing Enterprises (DOPEs) produce no exports and exclusively supply China’s 
domestic market. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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tion is modelled using nested CES functions that assume constant returns to scale (CRS). 
Household demand is modelled by the Linear Expenditure System (LES). Trade is mod-
elled by the Armington assumption for import demand (i.e. intermediate, investment, 
household, government import demand), and a CET for export supply. The small country 
assumption holds for imports, meaning that import prices are exogenously determined in 
the model. All demand and supply functions are assumed to be homogeneous of degree 
zero in prices (or money-neutral behaviour). All commodity and factor markets are as-
sumed to clear by prices. Labour (with movement determined by the relative real income 
across sectors/regions and the CES) is assumed to be perfectly mobile within sec-
tors/regions in a short/long-run closure. This assures a single region-wide equilibrating 
wage rate for both skilled and unskilled labour. Land is assumed to be fixed and used 
solely for agricultural activity. Capital (with its movement driven by relative rental rates 
across sectors/regions and the CES) is assumed to be partially mobile, reflecting differ-
ences in the marketability of capital goods across sectors/regions. It is assumed capital is 
immobile in a short-run closure, and perfectly mobile in a long-run closure. 
The current PRGEM used for this research has a simple recursive dynamic struc-
ture. Dynamics in the PRCGEM originate from accumulation of the productive factors and 
productivity changes, taking into account changes in industrial structure, factor composi-
tion and comparative advantage. The base year is 1997. The model is solved directly for 
subsequent years to 2002. Then, using the resulting 2002 baseline, the model is solved for 
2007, when most requirements in the WTO protocol are deemed to be implemented. 
Growth rates are exogenous for population, tariff/non-tariff barriers, duty exemption, capi-
tal, land, labour force and labour productivity.     
 
 
5  Database, baseline and scenario design  
 
China’s WTO accession includes a complex package of trade and investment liberalisation. 
Based on the final commitments made for market accession, this paper quantifies the im-
pacts of the following: 
•  tariff reductions on agricultural and industrial products; 
•  elimination of duty exemption by 2007; and  
•  non-tariff barrier cuts in agriculture and industrial commodities. Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
 
Effects of WTO membership on income distribution 




  22 
 
At best, this analysis only captures a fraction of the impacts of China’s WTO membership. 
It necessarily avoids such obviously important issues as the dismantling of barriers in ser-
vices, FDI and enforcement of WTO commitments.  
In view of the high, unpredictable tariff exemption and other aspects of China’s im-
ports,
34 we use MFN tariff rates to represent the effective tariff rate rather than the nominal 
tariff rate. Welfare and other effects from cutting this tariff are fairly modest, given the low 
share of government tariff revenue since the early 1990s. China’s government tariff reve-
nue share of total tax revenue drifted in the range of 3.38–6.45% between 1990 and 2003, 
i.e. tariff revenue accounted for only a sliver of total government revenue. Thus, it is 
unlikely that trade liberalisation (tariff cuts) will have much impact on government policy 
or expenditure decisions. Reducing tariff duties could generally reduce government reve-
nues, or, in the case of high import tariff rates, increase tariff revenues where there is in-
centive to bypass tariff payments through smuggling, illegally eliciting the support from 
customs officials to reduce the declared value of the imports or similar grey-market behav-
iour (i.e. lowering the import duty reduces incentives to cheat and results in more goods 
trading through official import channels). We must omit such speculation from our empiri-
cal model, of course, and note simply that the government is free to offset any declines in 
tariff revenue with increases in other sources of revenue such as the income tax. The tariff 
rates projected in Table 5 fall gradually from 1997 to 2002. The change after 2007 is neg-
ligible, even if China does not complete full implementation of its promised tariff cuts until 
2010. We thus take 2007 as the “final year” for China’s tariff cuts under its WTO acces-
sion commitments.   
 
5.1  Data and special considerations 35 
 
The base case projection over a five-year period (2002–2007) is established with 2002 Re-
gional/National I/O Table (derived from the 1997/2000 National I/O Table and 2000 Re-
                                                 
34 It is well recognised that China’s tariff collections are significantly below the nominal tariff level due to 
the large volume of processed trade, extensive import duty exemptions and widespread smuggling (World 
Bank, 1994 and Bach, et al., 1996).   
35 Appendix I provides detailed summary of database. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/ 2005 
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gional I/O Table using the RAS method
36 supported with data from various China Statisti-
cal Yearbooks).   
The data in the Trade, Tariff and Production dataset are grouped and simplified for 
ease of presentation. An exchange rate of 829 renminbi per 100 US dollars (1995–2003 
average) is used. Again, we do not take into account several major aspects of WTO acces-
sion, including the reduction of barriers in service trade (sectors 24-40), foreign investment 
(FDI), the MFA phase-out for textiles and apparel, protection of intellectual property 
rights, securing market access and cooperation in dispute settlement. 
Using W to represent factor prices, K  as capital and P  as output prices, our focus 










, i.e. the effects on factor prices (W ) of changing prices due to 
free trade and impacts on factor prices of changing capital stocks due to foreign invest-
ment. 
Most CGE models aggregate household categories, which limits their usefulness for 
poverty and income distribution analysis.  
 
5.2  Baseline scenario 
 
In order to simulate the impact of China’s WTO accession, we select one baseline scenario 
(in 2002) and two main simulations of the period 2002–2007. For the baseline scenario, we 
assume no trade reform (tariff/non-tariff or duty exemption cut) takes place during the pe-
riod 2002–2007 (Table 5). We also assume economic development without WTO member-
ship in 2002–2007 follows the same path as in 1997–2002.
37 “Short-run” and “long-run” 
simulations beyond the baseline simulation are considered to isolate and quantify the im-
pacts of “tariff” and “tariff & non-tariff” reductions and duty exemption cut for China’s 
WTO accession. There are two macro-closures
38 for the short/long-run simulations. In both 
cases, CIF foreign currency import prices, exchange rate, number of households, power of 
tariffs/non-tariffs, use of land, most technical change and shift variables are treated as ex-
ogenous, such that:  
                                                 
36 We apply a “biproportional” row-and-column operation; from Bacharach (1970). 
37 While it is a strong assumption that economic structural change and development are the same in 1997–
2002 and 2002–2007, it could conceivably occur if the business cycle period was five years. 
38 Closure rules are applied to classify model variables as endogenous (i.e. values are determined by the 
model) or exogenous (values are pre-determined or shocks external to the model). The number of endoge-
nous variables must equal the number of equations. Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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•  In the closure of short-run simulations, aggregate use of capital and aggregate real 
investment expenditure are fixed and allocated among industries according to the 
changes in the investment capital ratio; the labour supply between regions/sectors is 
mobile, but the total labour supply is exogenous. 
•  In the closure of long-run simulations, the supply of capital is elastic across sectors 
and regions, capital stocks are determined by the exogenous rate of return, the in-
vestment capital ratio is fixed, and the labour supply (e.g. aggregate employment 
with wage bill weights) is fixed and mobile between 40 sectors. The total labour 
supply is again exogenous. 
We use equivalent variation (EV) as a measure of the welfare impacts of China’s trade lib-
eralisation.
39 PRCGEM’s lack of an inter-temporal utility function complicates the deter-
mination of the total welfare effect of China’s accession, so we take EV as a measure of 
the change in the consumer surplus, i.e. the social welfare impact of China’s trade liberali-
sation. Thus, EV takes the pre-policy equilibrium income and consumer price index as 
given and measures the changes in income required to obtain the post-policy utility level at 





where CPI is the pre-policy (baseline) consumer price index, which is assumed unity; CAi 
is sectoral post-policy (simulation) consumption; CBi is sectoral pre-policy (baseline) 
household consumption; and c is the percentage change in consumption. A positive EV 
value means improved welfare (gain); a negative EV means reduced welfare (loss). 
Movement of labour
40 has become a prominent feature of China’s economic devel-
opment, reflecting ongoing changes in the internal division of work. Early rural reforms 
                                                 
39 The most direct way to measure the welfare effects of a price change is to assess how it affects the maxi-
mum utility level a consumer can achieve. Two expenditure-based measures are widely used: 
•  Equivalent Variation (EV), the minimum (maximum) amount of money which would have to be 
given to (taken away from) an individual to make them as well off as they would have been after 
the price fall (rise); and  
•  Compensating Variation (CV), the amount of money that leaves a person as well off as they were 
before a change, measuring the amount of money required to maintain a person’s satisfaction, or 
economic welfare, at the level it was before the change. 
40 In view of the short-term characteristics of labour movement between regions and other difficulties of 
tracking such mobility, we prefer to talk about “movement” rather than “migration” to avoid confusion. 
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(i.e. development of Township and Village Enterprises)
41 led to an initial increase in rural 
incomes. With the success of the agricultural reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, food supply in China’s cities increased dramatically, making it pos-
sible for people to come in from rural areas and survive without food rationing. As rural 
incomes began to level off, farmers started to look for alternative sources of income. In the 
mid-1980s, regulations concerning the movement of labour were revised to at least tempo-
rarily relax enforcement of labour-movement restrictions. Since 1986, and especially since 
1998, inequality (mainly rural-urban inequality) has widened as the effects of other reform 
policies (non-state sector growth) have started to be felt.  
Transition to a market-oriented economy creates a high disparity in economic de-
velopment among regions. Movement of labour in China mainly consists of surplus labour 
moving from rural areas to rapidly developing urban areas.
42 While the majority of rural 
residents moving to cities have only high school or primary school educations, they have 
generally made positive contributions to the rapid growth of coastal areas. Not only have 
they helped build China’s new urban infrastructure, they have been crucial in keeping la-
bour-intensive sectors in coastal regions internationally competitive. Movers also transfer 
resources (remittances, investments, information, etc.) back to their home villages, con-
tributing to rural economic development and helping reduce income disparities. 
This study focuses on inter-regional movement of labour and resulting impacts on 
regional income inequality, and leaves open opportunities for further research on rural-
urban and intra-regional labour movement. We assume simply that a wage difference 
across regions results in movement of labour,




( ) r e r e
move
r e W W L − ⋅ = , , α               e,r = 1,2,3…….31    
                                                 
41 Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), initially established in late 1950s, were responsible for estab-
lishing and promoting rural industry. TVEs today are the single largest source of employment for industrial 
workers. See Fu and Balasubramanyam (2003) for details.   
42 Further discussion of movement of labour and migration in China can be found in Huang and Pieke (2003) 
and Wan et al. (2005). 
43 When the wage in the destination region is relatively high, labour moves to pursue the higher wage. In re-
ality, the movement of labour is influenced by many factors beyond the wage rate differences such as differ-
ences in regional unemployment rates, population size or density, agricultural contribution to GDP (surplus 
rural labour accounts for a good deal of labour movement) and distance from home. For details, see Wan et 
al. (2005). 
44 Beyond regional wage differences, other factors (distances, culture shock, etc.) may militate against labour 
movement/migration. Again, see Wan et al. (2005) for details. Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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move
r e L ,  = Labour movement from Region e (origin) to Region r (destination) 
r e, α    = Coefficient 
i W     = Wage rate (i = e, r) 
 
The purpose of introducing labour movement between regions is to re-measure re-
gional inequality, which traditionally has been calculated without considering massive 
movements of labour. We thus hypothesise that potential regional inequality will be lower 
when net labour movement is considered in the calculation of per capita income across re-
gions. 
We quantify the impact from tariff and non-tariff liberalisation with removal of 
duty exemption on agricultural and manufactured sectors under China’s November 2001 
WTO accession protocol in our short- and long-run simulations. Using gravity equation 
estimates, Francois and Spinanger (2002) solve for tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers 
in the service sectors before and after China’s accession.
45 We focus here on the agricul-
ture and manufacturing sectors as there are no import tariffs in the service sector, only 
trade barriers such as quotas and licences. We thus leave service-sector liberalisation for 
further research
46 with the acknowledgement that service-sector trade liberalisation will 
directly affects the service production and trade and have significant implications for other 
sectors in the economy through the channel of international transportation margins and 
forward-linkages through inter-industry input-output relations (Robinson et al., 2002). 
Thus, our findings should likely underestimate impacts on social welfare, and export and 
import growth. 
China enjoys reciprocal benefits from WTO membership. We use a single-country 
model here, so we only consider a single rest-of-the-world input and omit feedback effects. 
The effects of reciprocal benefits from WTO in PRCGEM show up when we shock export 
demand. 
  In the policy simulations, we analyse the effects of trade liberalisation on GDP, 
household, export and stocks demands, supply of domestic and imported goods, price of 
                                                 
45 Service sectors include wholesale and retail trade, transportation services (land, water and air), telecommu-
nications, construction, finance, insurance and real estate services, other commercial services and other ser-
vices (health care, etc.).  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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exports, capital, land and labour, employment and investment. Sensitivity analysis follows 
to check how sensible the simulation results are on the key parameters (export elasticity, 
Armington index, etc.). 
 
 
6  Simulation results for trade liberalisation 
 
As mentioned, we consider just two closures:  
(i)  The closure of a unilateral tariff/tariff&non-tariff
47 cut with removal of duty ex-
emption
48 in non-service sectors as required by WTO accession.
49  
(ii)  The closure of full economic structural and development besides closure (i).
50 
Gradual liberalisation, which allows domestic firms to adjust and transform 
their productive structure gradually to face competition with foreign products 
on the domestic market, is considered. 
 
Base Case: 2002 I/O Table (40 sectors, 2 households, 31 regions) 
2002 Regional I/O Table (31 regions, 40 sectors) 
•  Short-Run, Only WTO (tariff/non-tariff and duty exemption);  
•  Long-Run, Only WTO (tariff/non-tariff and duty exemption); 
•  Short-Run, Full Economic Structural and Development (tariff/non-tariff and duty 
exemption plus normal economic development with same trend as 1997–2002
51);
52     
•  Long-Run, Full Economic Structural and Development (tariff/non-tariff and duty 
                                                                                                                                                    
46 In a separate exercise, we introduce the tariff equivalent tariff cut on services from Francois and Spinagner 
(2002) and associated sector-specific productivity impacts from Mai et al. (2003) to study China’s service 
liberalisation due to WTO membership. 
47 We assume a 90% decrease from 1997 to 2005. This reaches zero in 2006, when the non-tariff barrier in 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors should have fallen by 90%. 
48 The duty exemption is assumed to be reduced to zero gradually during 2002–2007.  
49 Actually, this is the limited WTO effect. For simplicity, we use “Only WTO” to represent this effect 
throughout this paper. 
50 In this research, the reaction of other WTO member countries is ignored in this single-country CGE model. 
More detailed research on treating the response of the rest of the world requires a multi-country CGE model, 
which is beyond this paper. 
51 The baseline is the published 1997 I/O Regional/National Table which is calibrated according to the eco-
nomic growth with liberalisation for the period of 1997–2002, to produce an updated 2002 I/O Re-
gional/National Table. It is assumed that if the WTO liberalisation were not involved, China’s economy 
would just change as in 1997–2002 till 2007.  
52 Including closure (i). Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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exemption plus normal economic development with same trend as 1997–2002).
53   
 
Our CGE model has the advantage of indicating adjustment costs involved, especially in 
the short-run, due to the incomplete movement of certain factors. This can be detected in 
part through comparison of short-run and long-run simulations. The principle routes of im-
pact from China’s WTO accession within the model are straightforward. Chinese consum-
ers benefit from lower prices as trade barriers are reduced (they also likely benefit from 
increased choice, although this is not picked up in our calculations). Some industries (e.g. 
heavy industries and agriculture) are hurt by reduced protection, while other industries (es-
pecially export-oriented industries such as textiles and clothing) benefit considerably from 
improved access to overseas markets and reduced costs of intermediate imports. Aggregate 
output expands by 43.26% and real GDP 31.72% in the long-run full closure – both from 
larger markets (domestic and overseas) and because of more efficient resource allocation 
across sectors and regions. Liberalisation with economic structural change may well play 
an important role throughout the economy, but we have not attempted here to model 
changes in responsiveness or any growth-rate effect from a less restricted economy. The 
expectation that labour movement should be stronger in the short run than in the long run is 
confirmed by our results. Total regional labour movement under the full short-run closure 
is 5.8% higher than the full long-run closure. The regional picture confirms that regional 
inequality is still significant, especially for the full closure.
54  
 
6.1  Macro results 
 
Table 6 presents key efficiency indicators and other macroeconomic indicators under the 
short/long-run scenarios for China’s WTO accession, measuring deviations from the 2002 
baseline. Due to the low real tariff collection rate and tariff exemptions granted to EOPEs, 
the gains arising from the only WTO scenario are relatively small. The results show China 
benefits from its WTO accession in terms of real GDP, household consumption and trade. 
In 2007, China’s real GDP would be 6.48% (5.60%) higher than in the baseline of 2002 
under the pure short-run (long-run) WTO shock
55 and 22.46% (31.72%) higher under the 
short-run (long-run) full economic structural and development shock. Real investment 
                                                 
53 Including closure (ii). 
54 Regions along the coast are much better off than inland regions in China. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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would be 2.2% higher than in the base scenario in the long-run simulation for only WTO 
and 14.94% for full economic structural and development. Real household consumption 
would be 6.48% (5.60%) higher in the pure short-run (long-run) WTO shock, indicating 
the benefits to consumers from trade liberalisation are small. In the short-run (long-run) 
full shock, real household consumption rises to 22.46% (31.72%). 
China’s trade (exports and imports) grows rapidly, especially in the full closure. 
The pure WTO effect is only 5.96% (10.1%) for real imports (exports) in the long-run, 
which may be due to considering the 100% duty exemption tariff cut for EOPEs with al-
ready low real tariff rate.
56 The contribution of pure WTO effect on exports (imports) is 
US$35.01 (US$6.67) billion in the short-run closure, while it is US$29.43 (US$16.33) in 
the long-run closure. The real exchange rate depreciates in the pure WTO, while it appreci-
ates in the full closure because of the relatively strong increase in imports, originating from 
the reduction in import protection for import intermediates used in EOPEs. Trade (exports 
and imports) increases approximately 50% in the full closure. This may be partly the result 
of relatively low growth of real investment, which is only 2.2% (14.94%) in the long-run 
pure WTO closure (full closure). The Sectoral Gross Allocation Effect (GAE)
57 is 1.38% 
(1.44%) higher than the baseline in short-run (long-run) pure WTO closure, confirming 
that labour movement plays a role in labour productivity. The GAE increases to 6.29% 
(6.2%) in short-run (long-run) full closure.  
The factors interact. Generally, the gains in GDP and welfare result from the en-
hanced efficiency of resource allocation arising from increased specialisation with com-
parative advantage. Removing tariff/non-tariff protection rates encourages cheap imports 
of intermediates used in EOPEs, especially in the short-run simulation of only WTO, 
which in turn induces real appreciation of the Chinese currency. Trade in EOPEs accounts 
for more than 50% of China’s total trade (exports plus imports). Moreover, exports in 
EOPEs have high import content due to policy orientation and factors such as the nature of 
FDI. Thus, growth of exports is expected to result in a corresponding growth of imports, 
which in turn increases pressure for real depreciation of the currency. Relatively strong 
growth of exports, on the other hand, results in real currency appreciation that contributes 
                                                                                                                                                    
55 This result confirms the literature in Table A to some extent.  
56 Consequently, the results are trivial because most of the barriers do not exist significantly.  
57 GAE is used to measure the growth in aggregate labour productivity when employment shifts among sec-
tors, given relative labour productivities (Syrquin, 1986). For simplicity, the baseline GAE is assumed to be 
one.  Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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to further growth of imports. This real exchange factor has contributed to the rapid increase 
in China’s trade dependence and FDI inflows during the past two decades. With processing 
trade (from EOPEs) accounting for over 50% of China’s total trade, higher exports will 
result in a corresponding growth of imports. The only WTO shock shows slightly worse 
terms of trade, while the terms of trade are better with full economic structural and devel-
opment, especially in the short-run closure. There is no significant difference for demand 
on both non-peasant and peasant labour at around 13.5%. In the full economic structural 
and development closure, there is significant labour movement from rural to non-rural 
jobs, given the exogenous aggregate labour growth rate.      
 
6.2  Sectoral results 
 
Macro-level efficiency gains are not evenly distributed across sectors due to differences in 
industry structure across sectors. Table 7 reports the percentage change in real output, em-
ployment, trade, etc., induced by China’s WTO accession and full economic structural and 
development. The agriculture sector imports less and exports more under the pure WTO 
shock, mainly due to a significant increase of real output.
58 However, full economic struc-
tural and development produces a totally opposite picture of higher real imports with de-
creasing real exports of agriculture in short/long-run closure. Real imports increase by 
102.41% (102.59%), while real exports decrease by 10.16% (4.58%) in the short-run 
(long-run) closure. Furthermore, WTO membership pushes up the relative position of both 
labour-intensive sectors (clothing and textiles, etc.) and capital-intensive sectors (electric 
equipment and machinery, etc.) significantly, especially in the closure of long-run full eco-
nomic structural and development. In the long-run full closure, the imports growth in tex-
tiles and clothings industries is much stronger than their exports growth rate.  
In the light of natural average employment growth of 13.82% in the simulation pe-
riod, the only WTO shock has little impact on employment movement between sectors, 
while the full economic structural and development significantly transfers labour from 
land-intensive agriculture to labour-intensive industry (clothing and textiles, etc.) in the 
long-run. However, the sectoral employment growth rate result shows that employment 
growth rate in the clothing industry is 1.4 (2.8) times higher than the national rate in the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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short-run (long-run) full closure, while the opposite is true for the textile industry. Con-
struction employment grows at a rate more than 2.5 times the national rate. The electronics 
and telecommunications sector leads both export growth and manufacturing development. 
Average total output growth in manufacturing sectors is over 40% in the long-run full clo-
sure, under 27% in agriculture, 68% in construction sector and over 38% in the service sec-
tors. 
The difference between short-run and long-run simulation is significant across sec-
tors, especially in the full closure, which implies some significant industry reconstruction 
adjustment upon further reform and liberalisation besides WTO membership. Manufactur-
ing industries lead China’s economic development.   
 
6.3  Provincial/regional results 
 
Economy-wide efficiency gains are also not distributed uniformly across regions within 
China. Provinces in China have different factor endowments, industrial structures, basic 
infrastructure and comparative advantages. Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the 
details of regional output, employment and trade (exports and imports) induced by China’s 
WTO membership and full economic structural and development. The larger the share of 
industries in provincial/regional output or trade relatively advantaged by full economic 
structural and development (WTO membership), the greater the benefits conferred on that 
particular province/region. According to economic geography and regional I/O table, we 
organise China’s 31 provinces into eight regional blocks.
59 
Table 8 and Table 9 show the uneven distribution of gains/losses from China’s 
WTO and full economic structural and development simulations. We see little impact in 
the only WTO simulation (around 1.1% annual real GDP growth), except in real imports 
and exports (where China made huge efforts to liberalise before accession). Expansion of 
foreign trade becomes significant, especially in the long-run simulation. The foreign trade 
of NMR, NCR and SCR is greater than in the rest of China. This may be due to the rela-
                                                                                                                                                    
58 Uniform technology improvement is assumed across sectors. Given the small contribution of the only 
WTO shock, real output can significantly improve only when the sectoral output share is sufficiently large. 
With full liberalisation, the story could well change.  
59 The regional blocks are: North-Eastern Region = NER (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang); North Municipali-
ties Region = NMR (Beijing, Tianjin); North Coastal Region = NCR (Hebei, Shandong); Central Coastal 
Region = CCR (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang); South Coastal Regions = SCR (Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan); 
Central Region = CR (Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan); North-Western Region = NWR (Mon-Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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tively large share of intermediate imports (used in EOPEs) in total imports and a relatively 
high dependence on exports. Higher economic growth in NMR, NCR and SCR increase 
the demand for labour, so rising wages in these regions attract labour from the rest of 
China. For example, employment in NMR and SCR increases by 25.13% (24.17%) and 
15.12% (16.88%) in the short-run (long-run) full economic structural and development 
closure. The contribution from the only WTO shock, however, is not significant; the na-
tional average labour force grows around 13.82%. The welfare gain mostly comes from 
coastal regions. As expected, everyone is better off upon liberalisation. But because some 
regions develop faster than others, regional inequalities persist. 
Studies of China’s regional income inequality traditionally have relied on per capita 
income derived from household registration. This may bias the true picture when extensive 
labour movement is involved. Certainly, the notion of significant inter-regional labour 
movement is not challenged. In 2002, 35.51% of total labour movement was to Guangdong 
province, 22.07% to the CCR and 6.91% to the NWR (Figure 3). Due to wage inequality 
and the economic development gap across regions, labour tends to move from poor west-
ern regions (especially the South-Western Region) to the rich coastal regions (especially 
the South-Coastal and Central Region). Figure 6 and Figure 7 find that total inter-regional 
labour movement increases from 42.42 million people in 2002 to 75.94 (71.78) million in 
the short-run (long-run) full closure, while the contribution of pure WTO closure is slightly 
negative for labour movement.
60 This may be due to the decreasing regional wage differ-
ence under pure WTO closure. The distribution of inter-regional labour movement is still 
biased to coastal regions (Figure 4).
61 The situation under the long-run WTO closure is 
more or less the same (Figure 5). Major labour movement indicates regional income ine-
quality. As labour sources, the SWR (particularly, Sichuan province) and CR dominate at 
22.86% (21.62%) and 36.96% (37.78%) in the short-run (long-run) full closure, respec-
tively (Figure 6 and Figure 7). The same is true for the WTO shock (Figure 4 and Figure 
5). The result generally shows that the distribution of labour movement leads to slightly 
                                                                                                                                                    
golia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xingjiang); South-Western Region = SWR (Guangxi, Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet). 
60 Detailed results of inter-regional labour movement for 31 regions are available upon request.  
61 For example, for the North Municipalities Region, Central Coastal Region and South Coastal Region (i.e. 
Guangdong province) – 35.5% (22.34%) of total moving labour goes to the Guangdong province (SCR) in 
the short-run WTO shock and only 6.83% moves to the NWR, where economic development lags far behind 
coastal regions.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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greater equality across regions with full economic structural change and development. The 
amount of labour movement increases dramatically to 70%. 
Thus, China’s regional income inequality is slightly over-estimated when we ignore 
the issue of labour movement and its contribution to economic development (Table 11). 
The Gini coefficient for the 2002 baseline is 0.281 (0.311) with (without) consideration of 
inter-regional labour movement. The coefficient rises to 0.311 (0.317) in the short-run clo-
sure and 0.309 (0.312) in long-run closure of only WTO (full economic structural and de-
velopment) when regional labour movement is ignored. It becomes 0.285 (0.269) in short-
run closure and 0.281 (0.268) in long-run closure of only WTO (full economic structural 
and development). The same is true for the eight regional blocks: Gini coefficients de-
crease when labour movement is considered (Table 11). The regions where the greatest 
labour movement is involved see relatively substantial changes in the Gini coefficients, i.e. 
coastal regions (top destinations for labour movement) and central regions (top origins of 
labour movement) play an important role. In the short-run (long-run) WTO shock, the in-
come inequality in the CCR is over-estimated by 18.54% (19.49%) when inter-regional 
labour movement is ignored in calculating the Gini coefficient. It becomes larger in the full 
economic development simulation – GINI coefficients at the CCR are overestimated by 
31.26% (29.11%) in the short-run (long-run) closure. In the CR, the Gini coefficient de-




7  Major policy implications and limitations 
 
This paper analysed the impact of China’s WTO accession using a multi-region multi-
sectoral single country CGE model (PRCGEM). Here, only tariff/non-tariff liberalisation 
and duty exemption cuts in agricultural and manufacturing sectors were considered. Yet, 
even with these changes, China was shown to gain considerably in terms of economic effi-
ciency. When China implements its required commitments for market access in agricul-
tural and manufacturing sectors in 2007, real GDP and welfare (measured in Hicks EV) 
beyond normal economic development was found to increase 6.48% (5.60%), or RMB 
7,615.15 billion (RMB 6,585.69 billion) in the short-run (long-run) WTO closure. The 
pure WTO shock was found to contribute approximately 1.1% in additional real GDP Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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growth rate annually. Thus, the larger gains in real GDP were mainly due to enhanced effi-
ciency of resource allocation brought about by a rapid trade growth and real output in ac-
cordance with regional/sectoral comparative advantage in China. When full economic 
structural and development with recursive closure was considered, China’s efficiency gains 
(in particular, from technology improvement in production factor of capital, land and la-
bour) were even larger. However, gains were not evenly distributed either across sectors or 
across regions due to the different industry features and regional economic differences. 
This suggested several ways in which globalisation might play a role in increasing regional 
inequality in China:  
 
•  Regions with location advantages (i.e. coastal regions) are better positioned to ex-
ploit benefits of trade and investment (Lin, 2002).  
•  Industrial infrastructure under government policy preferences may place some re-
gions in better positions to attract investment and trade (Demurger, 2001 and Wan 
et al., 2003).
62  
•  Despite a uniform national policy of opening up, different customs and traditions 
across regions result in different abilities to accept foreign capital with technolo-
gies.  
•  China’s affluent east regions enjoy disproportionally generous fiscal transfers.  
 
The results for China’s WTO membership with full economic structural and development 
may imply some sort of dramatic economic structural adjustment with large adjustment 
costs. One direct impact could be on structural unemployment upon liberalisation. The 
model assumes full employment, with labour moving across sectors and regions to clear 
the labour market. When the inter-regional difference in wages was considered alone, huge 
labour movements occurred under the full closure. Labour movement’s share of total em-
ployment increased from 5.75% in 2002 to 9.93% (9.14%) in the short-run (long-run) full 
closure, while it decreased slightly to 4.45% (4.61%) in the pure WTO closure.
63  
                                                 
62 Wan et al. (2003) find that domestic capital plays a dominant role in rising regional inequality after the 
mid-1980s. Infrastructure is also found to contribute to regional inequality, while privatisation apparently 
helps equalise incomes across regions.  
63 In terms of people, total labour movement will increase from 42.42 million to 75.94 million (71.78 million) 
in the short-run (long-run) full closure, while it decreases to 37.43 million (38.52 million) in the short-run 
(long-run) WTO shock.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Labour movement in China mostly involves millions of farmers moving from the 
agricultural sector (regions dominated by agriculture) to the non-agricultural sector (re-
gions with high growth in the manufacturing and service sectors), with internal reform (or 
liberalisation) and foreign trade/investment liberalisation appearing to play significant 
roles. Thus, labour-intensive sectors (i.e. textile and clothing) are the main beneficiaries.  
These results have several important implications for policy makers. Although total 
welfare was found to improve considerably, substantial adjustment costs (e.g. changes in 
industrial structure as a result of liberalisation and reform) may also be involved. With the 
structural adjustment added to the economy-wide benefits, the role of both central and lo-
cal governments becomes crucial.  
Due to the low degree of regional integration resulting mainly from local protection 
in China, regional disparities could well emerge as significant issues as liberalisation pro-
ceeds. Indeed, labour movement between regions to some extent is a reflection of regional 
inequality. Yet, while removing the limitations of labour movement could help reduce re-
gional disparities, their removal could also harm regional economic development and sta-
bility. Massive labour movement between regions in China has thus become an important 
economic issue and a major social problem. A healthy and complete social security system 
is thus urgently needed to facilitate labour movement. Governments (both central and lo-
cal) should encourage regional integration by investing more in infrastructure, education 
and transport not only in faster growing coastal provinces but also inland, so that the eco-
nomic efficiency benefits of liberalisation are widely spread.  
Finally, the factors (factor endowment, geography, basic infrastructure, etc.) under-
lying economic gaps among regions constitute potential obstacles to further economic 
growth. Rapid economic expansion does not automatically improve the welfare of all indi-
viduals in a society. Our results suggest that inequality across regions is falling, although 
some regions continue to benefit more than others. By joining the WTO, China is expected 
to eventually develop an open economy that is strong enough to deal head on with pres-
sures from global competition and domestic disparity. Hence, while income inequality may 
worsen in the short run, it is expected to improve after transition as adjustment policies 
take effect.  
Of course, simple calculation of gains and losses does not indicate whether gainers 
will actually be willing to share their gains with losers. Public sector investment, financed 
mainly through taxation of gainers, as well as inter-regional and inter-household transfers, Jiao Wang, David Mayes and Guanghua Wan 
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will be required in development of an equitable Chinese society. The extent of that taxation 
in itself will affect the incentives for investment by the successful and profits available for 
reinvestment. This complex set of concerns will ultimately need to be addressed in future 
simulations. 
  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Input-Output (IO) Tables 
Input-Output (IO) accounts provide detailed information on the flows of goods and 
services that make up the production process of industries. They are presented in the 
form of Use, Make, Direct Requirements and Total Requirements tables. The source 
used in this PRCGEM model is the updated 2002 Regional/National I/O table based 
on “Input-Output Table of China in 1997” (from China’s State Statistical Bureau, 
which includes 124 sectors, 2 households and 31 regions), “Intermediate Use Part of 
2000 Input-Output Table
1 (from China’s Statistical Yearbook 2003) and “Multi-
Regional Input-Output Model for China 2000” (from the Institute of Developing 
Economics, Japan External Trade Organization). Here, we aggregate to 40 sectors.
2 
Of the 40 sectors, there is one for agriculture (sector 1), 25 for manufactures (sectors 
2-26), one for construction (sector 27) and 13 for services (sectors 24-40 in Table 5). 
The intermediate input matrix (commodity-by-commodity matrix) refers to the sum of 
domestic and imported intermediate transactions. Household consumption, 
government consumption, capital formation, exports and change in inventories are the 
final demand categories. Exports are valued FOB. The unit of measurement of the 
2002 IO Table is 10,000 renminbi, while PRCGEM is expressed in RMB 100 million.  
 
Tariff Data 
To take some account of tariff exemptions, we use the MFN tariff rate for the 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors rather than the nominal tariff rate. Between 
1997 and 2000, the tariff rate (MFN) changed little compared to the period 1992–
1997. Due to the lack of complete tariff information between 1997 and 2000, we 
assume initially there was no tariff change between 1997 and 2000. In 1997, the 
unweighted average effective tariff rate for agriculture and manufacturing sectors was 
5.50% (Table 5), while the unweighted average MFN counterpart was 13.72%. 
According to the tariff revenue data for 1997, the effective tariff rate was much 
                                                 
1 In this Input-Output table, only 17 sectors are considered. 
2 Due to the data limitations, we choose 40 sectors for our model to sufficiently constrain the results. 
This narrowing also helps in comparison with other studies, which typically use about the same number 
of sectors.  
smaller than the MFN tariff rate (Table 5).
3 The sectoral reduction rates of import 
tariffs are aggregated from the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HS) tariff schedules for the period 2002–2007 in China’s WTO accession 
final offer. The MFN tariff data after 2002 are from China’s WTO protocol and the 
percentage change in MFN tariff from 2002 to 2007 is used to shock the effective 
tariff change after 1997/2002. The unweighted average MFN tariff rate for agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors is anticipated to fall from 12.06% upon accession to 7.51% 
in 2007. Table 3 shows that imports are dominated by manufactured goods (more than 
80%) compared with agricultural commodities (less than 8.4%). The effective tariff 




31-Region, 40-Sector PRCGEM 
1.  Price block 
Despite its name, the “small country” assumption
4 is appropriate here, given China’s 
role in world trade and the fact it is a price-taker. Thus, world import prices are 
treated as exogenous in terms of foreign currency. Purchaser prices are sums of basic 
values and sales taxes. All demand and supply functions in PRCGEM are assumed 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices, so behaviour is money-neutral, i.e. only 
relative price matters in determining quantities of commodities. Normally, the 
exchange rate (the price of a dollar in Chinese currency) is taken as an exogenous 
numeraire. Zero pure-profit conditions (e.g. zero pure profit in importing, whereby the 
import price is equal to foreign currency import price times exchange rate and tariff) 
and constant returns to scale are assumed, implying basic values are solely functions 
of input prices. Users minimise their costs by consuming the composite commodities 
from imported and domestic sources. Producers maximise their profits by selling 
commodities to the domestic market and the rest of the world.    
                                                 
3 The share of tariff revenue in China’s government tax revenue is less than 6% on average in the 
period 1990–2003.  Therefore, we expect tariff liberalisation will have little direct impact on 
government tax revenues. 
4 We assume China can export or import any desired quantity at international prices fixed in foreign 
currency.  
2. Production block 
There are 40 sectors in the PRCGEM model. All sectors operate at constant returns to 
scale in production. Each industry can only produce one product, which means there 
are 40 commodities. Each producer uses domestic and imported intermediates and 
primary goods (such as labour, capital and land) for production under nested 
Leontief/CES
5 production functions, and then supplies the domestic absorption and 
exports on a CET basis to maximise profits and pay wages to labour factor and rentals 
to owners of land and capital. All foreign producers and consumers are treated as “rest 
of the world” under the assumption of “same tastes.” 
 
3. Demand block (household, government and investor) 
The household sector is disaggregated into peasant and non-peasant households, with 
aggregate spending exogenous and proportional to GDP. The utility functions allow 
substitution between commodities through a Linear Expenditure System (LES)
6 
(Philips, 1974) and between domestic and imported sources. Government 
consumption demand is exogenous, and revenue derives from indirect taxation (taxes 
on basic flows plus the tariff revenue). 
Following the 1994 taxation reform in China, import tariff revenue declined 
due to trade liberalisation and the value-added tax (based on the value-added of 
industries) gradually assumed prominence as the government’s most important source 
of domestic tax revenue. 
Investors create capital goods from domestic and imported commodities on a 
CES basis. Investment is bound by exogenous investment/capital ratios or related to 
relative rates of return.    
 
4.  Trade block 
Most CGE models incorporate imperfect competition in all markets, imperfect 
substitution in all markets and imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic 
goods and between alternative sources of imports (as in the Armington model of 
                                                 
5 CES functions are used in CGE modelling because they are well-behaved, reasonably flexible and 
consistent with assumptions commonly used in economic models, particularly linear homogeneity and 
homotheticity. Cobb-Douglas and Leontief functions are essentially special cases of CES functions. 
6 Expenditure on each good in an LES is a linear function of prices and total expenditure.  
trade).
7 Here, we adopt the Armington specification to model foreign trade as a CES 
aggregation of imported and domestically produced commodities from the viewpoint 
of domestic producers and consumers. CET export transformation functions are used 
to describe how production can be transformed into domestic and foreign parts. In 
sectors lacking any imports, the CES function is dropped, i.e. composite good demand 
equals domestic sales. In sectors without exports, the CET function is also dropped, 
resulting in equality between domestic output and domestic sales.  
 
5.  Market-clearing block 
In the product market, equilibrium is reached when total supply of each composite 
commodity (goods and factors) is equal to all domestic demand in the same category 
and each sector earns zero profit. The labour market is not cleared.  
In the short-run comparative-static capital market, capital is sector-fixed 
(shocked for forecasting, un-shocked for short-run simulation) and investment/capital 
ratios are linked to capital rental rates (deflated by new capital prices) in the 
endogenous investment industries.  
In the long-run comparative-static capital market, capital stocks are 
determined by rates of return, because capital is assumed to be inter-sectorally mobile. 
Capital stock in the PRCGEM model is defined as the last period’s capital stock plus 
net investment deflated by the depreciation rate. In the long run, gross investment is 
endogenously specified for allocation among industries according to a fixed 
investment/capital ratio or relative rate of return in each sector, while the gross rate of 
return on new capital (investment) is exogenous. 
6.  Closure  
PRCGEM has the flexibility to designate different variables as exogenous (closure). 
By altering closure rules, it is easy to switch for comparative-static long/short-run 
simulations or dynamic long/short-run forecasts (similar to the MONASH Model),
8  
                                                 
7 This approach has been criticised. Senhadji (1997) points out two common problems with the use of 
the Armington (1969) aggregator in CGE analysis. First, it fixes the weight coefficients in the CES 
function based on the factor shares, which is incorrect because those coefficient weights correspond to 
the input shares only in the Cobb-Douglas case. Second, by requiring that the calibrated model must 
replicate the given benchmark data, it entails that the variation in the elasticity of substitution must not 
affect the initial benchmark expenditure shares. This criticism was subsequently refuted by 
Willenbockel (1999); see Tongzon (2001). 
 
8 MONASH is a dynamic model of the Australian economy (Adams et al., 1994; Dixon and Rimmer, 
2001).  
since different closures represent different assumptions about factor/good markets and 
macro behaviour. Comparative-static simulations describe the deviation of the 
economy with a policy change (e.g. tariff cut) from the baseline where there is no 
policy change. We might ask, for example, “If tariffs are reduced by 5% on a range of 
goods, how far and in what direction would the overall economy diverge over one 
year from the baseline (i.e. what it would otherwise have been)?”  
Dynamic simulations, on the other hand, replicate known development 
patterns and forecast the possible future development patterns by incorporating 
technical changes and adjustment costs. For forecasting, it is necessary to consider all 
the exogenous shocks to the model over time to check the changes in the endogenous 
variables in a specified time (e.g. five years). While the dynamic model is closer to 
the real world, it is also far more complex and unpredictable (and sometimes more 
misleading) than its comparative-static counterpart. Figure 1 shows the comparative-
static interpretation of exports under the tariff liberalisation. The AC (Baseline) 
represents the state of the economy as it would be without tariff change over time. AB 
(post-simulation line) represents the state of the economy as it would be with only 
tariff liberalisation over time. Thus, the result from GEMPACK is the percentage 
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7.  Equation system 
Following the structure described above, PRCGEM equations can be grouped under 
the following classifications: 
•  Producers’ demands for produced/intermediate inputs and primary factors; 
•  Demands for inputs to capital creation/investment goods (no primary factors 
are used directly as inputs to capital formation, and the use of primary factors 
in capital creation is recognised through inputs of the construction 
commodity/service); 
•  Household demands; 
•  Export demands (traditional and non-traditional exports); 
•  Government demands; 
•  Demands for margins (wholesale and retail trade, transport); 
•  Prices: output, exports, imports, labour, capital and land (zero pure profits in 
production, capital creating and importing; zero pure profits in distribution; the 
price received by the producer is uniform across all customers); 
•  Market-clearing conditions for commodities and primary factors (demand 
equals supply for domestically produced margin and non-margin commodities 
and imported commodities); 
•  Indirect taxes; and 




Four solution methods for multi-step simulations
10 are used in PRCGEM: Johansen 
(one step), Euler, Gragg and Midpoint. The Johansen solution is more inaccurate for 
larger shocks. Using subtotals, we divide up the effects of the shocks in PRCGEM. 
Johansen solutions are defined to be solutions obtained by solving the linearised 
equations of the model once, with inaccuracy increasing with the size of the shock. In 
Euler’s method, the direction to move under the shock at each step is essentially that 
of the tangent to the curve at the appropriate point. Gragg’s and the midpoint method 
                                                 
9 Detailed information is provided in GEMPACK User Documentation – GPD-3 (release 7.0) 
(http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/gpdoc.htm). 
10 The idea of a multi-step simulation is to break up each shock (from closure) into smaller pieces. In 
each step, linearised equations are solved for these smaller shocks and the data, shares and elasticities 
are recomputed to take into account the changes from the previous step. The more steps involved for 
the shocks, the more accurate the simulation.   
are similar to Euler’s method, following the tangent along the curve from the initial 
solution. The difference here is that Euler’s method follows the tangent from the 
current point, while Gragg’s and the midpoint method follow the tangent from the 
previous point. Gragg’s method also uses a more accurate method than Euler’s 
method for calculating the direction in which to move at each step. Gragg’s method 
and the midpoint method are otherwise identical, except that Gragg’s method does an 
extra pass. In order to get better simulation results, we need to have as many solution 
steps as possible. The idea behind the multi-step simulation is to divide the exogenous 
shocks into at least two pieces. In each step, the linearised equations are then 
calculated with these smaller shocks so as to be more close to the real economy. Next, 
subintervals
11 are chosen. In general, the more steps and subintervals the shocks are 









                                                 
11 The solution method is employed across each subinterval with the multi-step calculations (usually 




















     Economic Variable 
                                                                                    
 
 




                                              
 
                      
C 
                                                                      
 
                                                                                    
        
  B  
 
 
  A  
           
 
 
                                                 
0(T
0)                  T
*                                   T    T i m e  
Baseline (history) is between T
0 and T
* (AB) 
Baseline (projection) is between T
* and T (BC) 
Policy line is between T
* and T (BD) 
Policy effect (CD) 











Table 1. China’s average annual GDP growth rates (%), merchandise world trade and FDI (US$ billion), 
1960–2003 
Year Real  GDP 
Growth  
(% per year) 
Exports
a Imports




Average per year) 
5.1 4.6
d 4.8
 d  -0.2
 d  N/A 
1979-2003 
(Post-Reform 
Average per year) 
9.3 120.0
 e (2.41)  111.1
 e  (2.24)  8.9
 e  499.8
 f  
(666.8)
 f 
1990  3.8  62.9 (1.80)    53.9 (1.50)  9.0  3.5 (6.6) 
1991  9.2  71.9 (2.05)  63.9 (1.76)  8.1  4.4 (12.0) 
1992  14.2  85.5 (2.26)  81.8 (2.08)  3.6  11.0 (58.1) 
1993  13.5  91.6 (2.43)  103.6 (2.68)  -11.9  27.5 (111.4) 
1994  12.6  120.8 (2.80)  115.6 (2.61)  5.2  33.8 (82.7) 
1995  10.5  148.8 (2.88)  132.1 (2.50)  16.7  37.5 (91.3) 
1996  9.6  151.1 (2.80)  138.8 (2.51)  12.3  41.7 (73.3) 
1997  8.8  182.7 (3.28)  142.2 (2.49)  40.5  45.3 (51.0) 
1998  7.8  183.7 (3.34)  140.2 (2.48)  43.5  45.5 (52.1) 
1999  7.1  194.9 (3.41)  165.8 (2.81)  29.1  40.3 (41.2) 
2000  8.0  249.2 (3.87)  225.1 (3.36)  24.1  40.7 (62.4) 
2001  7.5  266.1 (4.29)  243.55 (3.77)  22.55  46.9 (69.2) 
2002  8.3  235.6 (5.02)  295.17 (4.40)  -59.57  52.7 (82.8) 
2003  9.3  438.23 (5.84)  412.76 (5.31)  25.47  53.5 (115.1) 
Notes:  a China’s share of world exports in parenthesis (%). 
b China’s share of world imports in parenthesis (%). 
c Total amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) actually used. FDI authorised by signed agreements and contracts in 
parenthesis. 
d Data for 1962–1978. 
e Data for 1980–2003. 
f Accumulated FDI. 
  Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (Various Volumes), Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
www.wto.org, and China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook.  
Table 2. Exports by selected sectors (US$ billion), 1994–2003 
Year  Total Exports  Textile and 
Garment 
Electrical Machinery, 

























































































Note: Sectoral share in total exports (%) in brackets; annual growth rate (%) in parenthesis. 
Source: China statistical yearbook (various volumes). 
  

















































1990 53.3  4.32  8.11    43.49 81.60  6.65  12.47  8.91 16.71  16.85  31.60  6.23 
1991 63.79  3.52  5.52    52.96 83.02  9.28  14.54  10.49 16.45  19.60  30.73  5.52 
1992 80.59  3.67  4.55    67.33 83.55  11.16  13.84  19.27  23.91  31.31  38.85  4.79 
1993 103.96  2.71  2.61    89.75 86.33  9.70  9.33  28.53 27.44  45.02  43.31  4.28 
1994 115.61  4.95  4.28    99.13 85.74  12.13  10.49  28.08 24.29  51.47  44.52  2.74 
1995 132.08  8.74  6.62    107.67 81.52  17.30  13.10  28.77 21.78  52.64  39.86  2.65 
1996 138.83  7.37  5.31    113.39 81.68  18.11  13.04  31.39  22.61  54.76  39.45  2.61 
1997 142.37  5.99  4.21    113.75 79.90  19.30  13.55  32.22  22.63  52.77  37.07  2.71 
1998 140.24  5.28  3.76    117.29 83.63  20.16  14.37  31.08  22.16  56.85  40.53  2.70 
1999 165.7  4.99  3.01    138.85 83.80  24.03  14.50  34.32 20.71  69.45  41.91  4.10 
2000 225.09  5.74  2.55    178.36 79.24  30.21  13.42  41.81 18.57  91.93  40.84  4.03 
2001 243.55  5.74  2.36    197.81 81.22  32.10  13.18  41.94 17.22  107.02  43.94  4.17 
2002 295.17  6.86  2.32    245.90 83.31  39.04  13.22  48.49  16.43  137.01  46.42  
2003 412.76  8.96  2.17    340.00 82.37  48.98  11.87  63.90    192.83   
Notes:  a Agricultural imports here refers to Food & Live Animals, Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes. 
b Ratio of total tariff revenue against total imports. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
  































































(4.30)  21.48  68.79 
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(1.10)  5.62  9.23 
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(0.42)  4.98  8.79 
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(0.72)  4.46  7.57 













(0.16)  3.95  6.85 













(0.37)  4.80  8.63 
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(0.17)  3.64  7.40 
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(0.50)  6.68  15.96 
















Notes: a Regional GDP share of total GDP in parenthesis (%). 
b Regional industry (e.g. Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Industry) share of regional GDP in parenthesis (%). 
c Service trade excluded. Regional share in parenthesis (%). 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2003).  
 
Table 5. Disaggregated tariff & NTB data for 1997–2006, % 
MFN Tariff Rate
 a %    Tariff Equivalent Rate
























































































1 Agriculture  22.52 21.455 20.415 19.392 19.288    0.38    2.91    52.73    40.52    32.44    26.98    24.07    22.31    19.29   
2  Coal mining and processing  5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77    0.02    1.95    11.70    9.51    8.13    7.26    6.71    6.37    5.77   
3  Crude petroleum and natural 
gas products 
6.8 6.53 6.53 6.53 6.53    0.10    0.36    12.73    10.28    8.89    8.02    7.47    7.13    6.53   
4 Metal  ore  mining  0 0 0 0 0    0.00    0.00    5.93    3.74    2.36    1.49    0.94    0.59    0.00   
5  Non-ferrous mineral mining  2.989 2.981 2.968 2.964 2.964   0.33    1.20    5.48    4.55    3.96    3.59    3.36    3.21    2.96   
6  Manufacture of food products 
and tobacco processing 
26.963 24.479 22.118 19.932 19.169    0.98    5.51    28.44    25.41    22.71    20.30    19.40    18.80    18.65   
7 Textile  goods  16.071 13.806 11.726 10.033  9.204    3.07    9.43    20.49    16.60    13.48    11.14    9.90    9.65    9.20   
8  Wearing apparel, leather, furs, 
down and related products 
18.969 17.809 16.799 15.777 15.269    2.35    7.81    22.19    19.84    18.08    16.58    15.78    15.59    15.27   
9  Sawmills and furniture  6.808 5.84  5.093  4.483  4.369    1.28    5.43    10.60    8.23    6.59    5.43    4.97    4.75    4.37   
10  Paper and products, printing 
and record medium 
reproduction 
12.221 10.293  8.494  7.102  6.13 
 
1.74    5.68    17.72    13.76    10.69    8.48    7.00    6.68    6.13   
11  Petroleum processing and 
coking 
6.416 6.366 6.306 6.306 6.306    0.68    0.77    7.68    7.17    6.81    6.62    6.51    6.43    6.31   
12 Chemicals  11.555 10.506  9.68  8.986  8.562    1.73    3.60    12.37    11.02    10.01    9.19    8.69    8.60    8.50   
13  Non-metal mineral products  15.009 14.252 13.647 13.228 13.051    0.48    10.1
8    15.01    14.25    13.65    13.23    13.05    13.05    13.05   
14  Metals smelting and pressing  8.779 8.321 8.159 8.081 8.069   0.79    2.06    11.30    9.91    9.17    8.71    8.47    8.32    8.07   
15 Metal  products  12.59 11.78 11.25 11.04 11.04    1.48    3.63    12.59    11.78    11.25    11.04    11.04    11.04    11.04   
16  Machinery and equipment  5.607 5.151 4.834 4.636 4.605   3.04    3.08    7.50    6.35    5.59    5.12    4.91    4.79    4.60   
17 Transport  equipment  11.143 10.044  9.013  8.254  7.586    2.77    4.34    21.54    16.61    13.15    10.87    9.23    7.42    6.38   
18 Electric  equipment  and 
machinery 
12.563 11.187 10.283  9.84  9.764    2.30    3.86    16.42    13.62    11.82    10.81    10.38    10.15    9.76   
19 Electronic  and 
telecommunication equipment 
9.896 7.642 6.475 6.065 6.007    2.19    2.68    14.82    10.74    8.43    7.30    6.79    6.50    6.01   
20 Instruments,  meters,  cultural 
and office machinery 
13.84 12.967 12.468 12.254 12.187    3.45    3.95    13.84    12.97    12.47    12.25    12.19    12.19    12.19   
21  Maintenance and repair of 
machinery and equipment 
0 0 0 0 0    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
22 Other  manufacturing   
products 
14.404 13.586 12.808 12.093  11.467    3.23    12.3
7    14.40    13.59    12.81    12.09    11.47    11.47    11.47   
23  Scrap and waste  4.32 4.01 3.85 3.67 3.51    0.00    0.00    4.32    4.01    3.85    3.67    3.51    3.34    3.18   
24  Electricity, steam and hot 
water production and supply 
1.45 1.05 0.76 0.55  0.4    11.8  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  5.90    
25  Gas production and supply  6.22 6 6 6 6    11.8  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  5.90   
26  Water production and supply  0 0 0 0 0    11.8  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  5.90   
27 Construction  0 0 0 0 0    13.68  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  6.84   
28  Transport and warehousing  0 0 0 0 0  3.97  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  1.99   
29  Post and telecommunication  0 0 0 0 0  0.18  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.09   
30  Wholesale and retail trade  0 0 0 0 0  1.84  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.92   
31  Eating and drinking places  0 0 0 0 0  1.84  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.92   
32 Passenger  transport  0 0 0 0 0  3.97  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  1.99   
33  Finance and insurance  0 0 0 0 0  8.08  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  4.04   
34 Real  estate  0 0 0 0 0  8.08  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  4.04   
35 Social  services  0 0 0 0 0  25.74  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  12.87   
36  Health services, sports and 
social welfare 
0 0 0 0 0  25.74  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  12.87   
37  Education, culture and arts, 
radio, film and television 
0 0 0 0 0  25.74  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  12.87   
38 Scientific  research  0 0 0 0 0  25.74  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  12.87   
39  General technical services  0 0 0 0 0  25.74  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  12.87   
40  Public administration and 
other sectors 
0 0 0 0 0  25.74  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  12.87   
Notes:  
a MFN tariff rate (or tariff bound) for 40 sectors is calculated according to the tariff rate for 124 sectors weighted by tariff revenue in 1997. 
b Total trade barriers including tariff and non-tariff barriers. Tariff data in the period of 1997–2000 are from (http://trade.chinavista.com/tariffsearch.html) and (http://www.apectariff.org/) and NTB tariff 
equivalent data are taken from Li and Lejour (2000) and Wang (2001b). Considering the high tariff exemption in China, we use the MFN tariff rate here. China’s updated WTO accession protocol assumes 
that NTB equivalents will be cut 100% for agriculture and the manufacture sector during the period 2001–2007.     
c Data in sectors 1–23 use the effective tariff rate based in the actual tariff revenue in 1997. Data in sectors 24–40 use the tariff equivalent rate based on gravity equation estimates (Francois and Spinanger, 
2002) 
d Data in sectors 1–23 are effective tariff rate according to the real tariff revenue in 2002. 
e Data in sectors 24–40 reflect an assumed 50% drop in cross-border trading cost estimates. 
Other tariff data (2001–2006) are from China’s WTO protocol in 2001. 
N/A stands for None Available.  
  Table 6. Macro results, % 
% Short-run  Long-run   










Macros  2002–2007 2002–2007 2002–2007 2002–2007 
% (Balance of trade)/GDP  1.98 2.96 0.66 0.38 
Aggregate employment-wage bill weights  13.82 13.82 13.82 13.82 
Total sum of welfare 
(EV):Household+Investment+Government+Trade 
(RMB billion)  7191.32 25041.20 6191.83 74201.33 
Welfare-Investment (EV) (RMB billion)  3144.53 10902.69 2719.46 54221.00 
Welfare-Government (EV) (RMB billion)  896.05 10021.81 774.92  9918.45 
Welfare-GDP (EV) (RMB billion)  7615.15 26403.15 6585.69 37278.37 
Welfare-Net Export or Trade (EV) (RMB billion)  3150.74 4116.70 1769.47 3763.84 
Sectoral Gross Allocation Effect (GAE)  1.38 6.29 1.44 6.20 
GDP Price Index, expenditure side  -5.29 39.63 -1.17 35.06 
Duty-paid Imports Price Index, RMB  0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Real devaluation  5.29 -39.63 1.17 -35.06 
Terms of trade  -2.40 15.95 -2.02  8.57 
Average capital rental  7.36 95.61 5.62 68.77 
Rental price of land  5.24 15.74 8.52 16.14 
Average input/output price  -4.99 14.49 -3.33 11.60 
Aggregate Investment Price Index    -1.15 67.00 7.19 63.08 
Consumer Price Index  -7.89 17.97 -6.04 17.06 
Exports Price Index  -2.40 15.95 -2.02  8.57 
Total demand for non-peasant labour    13.52 25.01 14.86 20.92 
Total demand for peasant labour    14.45 -12.94 12.30  -4.64 
CIF RMB value of imports  2.26 51.35 5.99 48.61 
Nominal GDP from expenditure side  1.19 62.10 4.43 66.77 
Value of imports plus duty  2.57 51.75 6.29 49.09 
Aggregate tariff revenue  -40.60 11.25 -37.11 10.80 
Aggregate payments to capital    7.36 95.61 8.20 90.08 
Aggregate payments to labour  -4.51 61.71 -0.35 56.07 
Aggregate payments to land  5.24 15.74 8.52 16.14 
Aggregate primary factor payments  0.31 73.49 3.17 68.06 
Aggregate nominal investment  -1.15 67.00 9.39 78.02 
Nominal total household consumption  -1.41 40.44 -0.44 48.77 
RMB border value of exports  9.61 66.19 8.08 55.74 
Import Volume Index, CIF weights    2.26 51.35 5.99 48.61 
Real GDP from expenditure side  6.48 22.46 5.60 31.72 
Import Volume Index, duty-paid weights  2.24 51.42 5.96 48.76 
Aggregate capital stock, rental weights  0.00 0.00 2.58  21.31 
Aggregate output: primary factor cost weights  8.15 37.71 9.14 40.60 
Activity level or value-added  7.80 39.84 9.20 43.26 
Aggregate real investment expenditure  0.00 0.00 2.20  14.94 
Real household consumption  6.48 22.46 5.60 31.72 
Export Volume Index  12.01 50.23 10.10 47.17 
Source: Simulation results  
Table 7. Percentage change in sectoral real output, employment and real trade upon China’s WTO accession, % 
    Only WTO Effect (Tariff/Non-Tariff Deduction and 100% Duty Exemption Cut)  Full Economic Structural And Development 
    Real Output  Employment  Real Imports  Real Exports  Real Output  Employment  Real Imports  Real Exports 
    S-Run L-Run S-Run  L-Run  S-Run L-Run S-Run  L-Run S-Run  L-Run  S-Run  L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run 
1  Agriculture  12.79    10.94    14.45    12.30    -6.51    0.89    43.53    34.37    17.57    27.12    -12.94    -4.64    102.41    102.59    -10.16    -4.58   
2  Coal mining 





products  1.61    4.84    10.24    11.30    20.36    19.41    -10.04    -4.61    52.58    41.02    50.11    31.03    20.50    9.71    93.71    78.01   
4  Metal ore 
mining  7.23    9.14    14.82    16.22    7.35    12.53    8.41    6.62    44.56    38.66    -2.67    -5.43    29.72    30.70    81.93    63.66   
5  Non-ferrous 





processing  9.31    8.16    24.83    16.70    -16.63    -15.66    21.57    18.89    24.40    52.07    -14.71    33.45    31.86    73.47    34.24    29.26   







products  12.03    11.17    20.24    15.91    -6.57    -6.14    20.05    18.42    40.55    66.76    19.87    38.78    44.85    86.44    59.14    53.18   
9  Sawmills and 










coking  7.35    9.40    22.71    28.66    2.78    6.57    3.94    3.68    43.57    36.25    30.85    49.71    29.70    21.70    70.18    57.59   








pressing  7.37    9.91    12.64    18.13    -2.86    4.90    9.13    6.36    43.65    42.80    23.72    31.99    47.18    49.13    54.71    44.36   
15  Metal products  7.03    9.78    12.75    14.48    -5.29    1.76    8.77    7.51    44.30    45.97    25.98    18.79    52.37    47.41    48.63    47.78    
16  Machinery and 
equipment  6.60    10.35    14.34    16.61    1.23    8.85    8.56    8.27    43.04    49.68    27.46    22.65    60.82    58.83    46.95    52.07   
17  Transport 














machinery  7.98    9.25    16.42    13.24    0.17    3.57    6.37    6.29    52.36    59.08    44.88    30.36    52.66    40.42    61.99    69.47   
21 
Maintenance 
and repair of 
machinery and 




products  7.82    8.96    16.74    14.64    4.80    6.91    12.81    12.02    37.31    33.57    17.63    0.14    46.24    37.01    34.84    36.72   
23  Scrap and 
waste  7.61    9.60    16.83    19.07    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    39.77    36.88    37.27    12.39    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
24 
Electricity, 
steam and hot 
water 
production and 
supply  6.44    8.28    23.77    17.56    20.47    15.57    -7.78    -0.35    39.48    37.58    30.94    41.63    203.76    223.69    35.41    5.38   
25  Gas production 




supply  5.93    7.39    20.85    18.92    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    46.19    37.13    -33.28    3.38    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
27  Construction  3.70    11.45    5.18    15.17    3.69    11.45    12.95    12.27    52.87    68.28    34.18    34.82    53.60    69.01    40.39    54.61   
28  Transport and 




tion  5.05    7.32    26.56    26.51    7.29    10.22    -3.15    -3.50    40.82    24.34    58.54    30.63    61.45    42.33    -0.92    -11.87   
30  Wholesale and 
retail trade  8.15    8.84    13.70    15.33    0.00    0.00    16.09    10.98    37.08    36.05    17.45    6.96    0.00    0.00    30.79    29.05   
31  Eating and 
drinking places  8.72    8.64    16.14    16.04    -1.35    1.31    25.91    20.41    35.84    29.75    12.42    -14.04    51.43    40.80    26.38    23.74   
32  Passenger 
transport  6.69    5.15    15.47    14.96    6.23    6.72    10.96    3.79    40.49    25.26    29.54    17.08    51.75    43.23    29.87    3.65    
33  Finance and 
insurance  5.99    7.73    13.81    10.90    6.79    7.97    1.80    8.40    37.29    25.84    30.26    -0.64    46.47    36.00    14.61    27.57   
34  Real estate  1.23    4.16    8.60    10.25    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    27.97    14.12    22.60    5.57    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   









arts, radio, film 
and television  6.56    5.72    7.71    6.75    -1.36    -0.03    19.77    14.59    57.70    53.13    36.28    25.76    82.82    64.50    7.08    14.59   
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sectors  6.49    5.61    8.09    7.14    6.48    5.60    16.80    12.33    72.42    71.68    56.07    48.31    74.34    73.59    22.89    28.71   
  Note: S-Run stands for short-run simulation; L-Run stands for long-run simulation. 
  Source: Simulation results.  
 Table 8. Regional impacts of “Only WTO” and “Full Economic Structural and Development,” % 
  Only WTO  Full Economic Structural and Development 
  Real Output  Employment  Real Imports  Real Exports  Real Output  Employment  Real Imports  Real Exports 
  S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run  L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run 
Beijing  7.20    8.70    12.44    14.04    2.04    6.26    9.91    8.18    51.12    50.87    37.01    38.38    59.12    56.56    59.48    58.13   
Tianjin  7.41    8.84    14.43    14.27    2.04    6.26    8.16    7.35    31.27    31.04    11.33    7.74    43.80    41.18    53.07    55.82   
Hebei  8.09    9.34    14.15    13.58    0.66    5.01    13.17    10.93    42.64    43.43    8.77    11.73    55.68    56.20    48.88    43.71   
Shanxi  7.71    9.17    13.40    13.63    2.68    6.61    12.01    9.43    40.56    40.60    11.08    13.25    42.37    40.91    47.30    40.55   
Mongolia  8.11    9.05    14.10    13.21    1.34    5.84    14.54    11.55    54.97    55.37    19.03    23.95    66.11    65.38    54.13    47.56   
Liaoning  7.66    9.23    13.78    13.86    3.36    7.07    10.88    9.01    21.54    21.03    -13.18    -11.99    32.76    29.37    34.84    30.85   
Jilin  8.11    9.30    13.80    13.23    3.36    7.07    11.07    9.43    59.01    59.16    29.23    31.12    66.15    62.76    62.67    57.61   
Heilong  7.61    9.21    13.65    13.27    3.36    7.07    9.68    8.29    24.51    23.49    -11.94    -11.96    34.08    30.55    37.36    30.73   
Shanghai  7.74    9.22    13.83    15.07    1.88    6.01    10.67    9.09    36.62    35.30    21.17    15.68    44.00    41.39    51.13    48.67   
Jiangsu  8.06    9.34    14.42    14.13    1.88    6.01    12.23    10.46    42.17    42.41    11.48    12.76    51.33    48.77    52.34    49.33   
Zhejiang  8.11    9.34    14.35    13.97    1.88    6.01    13.44    11.41    29.37    30.46    -7.00    -1.99    39.57    37.09    41.28    37.88   
Anhui  8.14    9.28    14.31    13.25    2.68    6.61    14.22    11.88    40.29    41.70    4.22    9.76    43.86    42.42    49.40    45.51   
Fujian  8.07    8.94    14.32    13.09    2.61    5.70    13.65    11.33    45.12    44.43    7.96    11.23    50.95    47.65    53.51    50.16   
Jiangxi  8.16    9.11    14.06    12.77    2.68    6.61    14.36    11.69    18.08    17.82    -17.77    -13.63    26.82    25.28    27.85    23.31   
Shandong  7.97    9.29    14.23    13.51    0.66    5.01    12.86    10.87    60.51    60.55    27.76    29.70    69.85    70.31    65.41    61.35   
Henan  8.08    9.28    14.24    13.32    2.68    6.61    13.55    11.29    41.23    41.78    5.74    9.17    51.90    50.38    46.50    41.71   
Hubei  7.87    9.20    14.22    13.38    2.68    6.61    13.43    11.38    34.50    35.08    -2.09    1.88    45.70    44.24    41.64    37.72   
Hunan  8.00    9.12    13.71    12.87    2.68    6.61    13.93    11.16    13.81    14.04    -21.89    -18.07    22.80    21.31    23.92    19.55   
Guangdong  7.90    8.98    14.52    13.78    2.61    5.70    11.25    9.47    50.34    49.48    20.48    20.82    56.17    52.86    62.51    60.54   
Guangxi  8.07    8.99    14.04    12.77    2.63    7.68    14.80    11.87    1.25    2.02    -36.43    -31.62    24.53    22.43    11.14    7.12   
Hainan  8.99    8.95    14.23    12.47    2.61    5.70    17.29    13.84    38.02    39.14    1.77    7.78    47.71    44.46    37.97    33.47   
Chongqing  7.62    8.95    13.05    13.04    2.63    7.68    12.15    10.04    20.76    20.83    -14.20    -11.61    39.98    37.86    28.01    24.00   
Sichuan  7.81    9.06    13.46    13.01    2.63    7.68    11.86    9.70    30.88    32.01    -5.11    -0.56    48.84    46.75    43.51    41.45   
Guizhou  8.00    9.05    13.80    12.67    2.63    7.68    13.72    11.28    18.24    20.05    -19.24    -12.94    36.97    34.93    27.03    23.10   
Yunnan  7.86    9.02    13.81    12.88    2.63    7.68    15.41    12.37    34.02    36.33    -3.92    3.76    52.08    50.08    34.63    30.50   
Tibet  8.32    8.56    13.26    12.03    2.63    7.68    17.73    13.31    33.79    35.42    7.80    12.31    38.53    36.46    29.57    25.17   
Shaanxi  7.74    8.91    13.73    13.03    1.34    5.84    10.77    8.82    26.69    26.70    -6.42    -2.50    41.70    40.97    41.87    39.77   
Gansu  7.88    9.13    13.88    13.68    1.34    5.84    11.07    9.20    42.87    42.24    9.39    11.75    55.07    54.24    52.09    45.70   
Qinghai  7.65    8.96    13.06    13.31    1.34    5.84    10.86    8.85    35.66    35.04    9.18    11.08    47.49    46.70    43.04    36.12   
Ningxia  7.80    9.09    13.74    13.71    1.34    5.84    11.26    9.29    37.48    37.27    5.72    8.69    50.59    49.83    43.85    37.63   
Xinjiang  7.93    8.97    13.79    12.99    1.34    5.84    10.15    8.70    39.78    37.27    6.21    6.49    51.56    50.59    49.12    39.93   




Table 9. Real output, employment, real imports and real exports; effects of regional blocks 
  Only WTO  Full Economic Structural And Development 
  Real Output  Employment  Real Imports  Real Exports  Real Output  Employment  Real Imports  Real Exports 
  S-Run L-Run  S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run  L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run  S-Run  L-Run 
N_Eastern  7.72    9.23    13.74    13.49    3.36    7.07    10.59 8.90    28.82 28.24    -1.23 -0.26    36.91    33.50    40.50 35.61   
N_Munici  7.30    8.76    13.36    14.15    2.04    6.26    8.74 7.63    42.11 41.87    25.18 24.26    53.54    50.97    55.19 56.58   
N_Coastal  8.02    9.31    14.20    13.54    0.66    5.01    12.96 10.89    53.79 54.11    20.06 22.42    67.67    68.14    60.27 55.87   
C_Coastal  8.00    9.31    14.33    14.19    1.88    6.01    12.15 10.36    36.72 36.88    7.23 8.79    45.85    43.28    49.05 46.08   
S_Coastal  7.97    8.97    14.43    13.46    2.61    5.70    11.81 9.90    48.66 47.89    15.06 16.76    55.59    52.29    60.40 58.13   
Central  8.00    9.21    14.07    13.21    2.68    6.61    13.68 11.32    32.69 33.21    -2.94 0.94    40.32    38.84    41.00 36.57   
N_Western  7.90    9.00    13.85    13.21    1.34    5.84    11.41 9.38    40.03 39.42    6.88 10.07    53.52    52.70    47.32 42.02   
S_Western  7.86    9.02    13.61    12.90    2.63    7.68    13.13 10.67    23.39 24.58    -14.94 -10.03    42.57    40.50    32.44 29.28   
Note: S-Run stands for short-run simulation; L-Run stands for long-run simulation. 
Source: Simulation results.  
 
Table 10.    Regional EV, real consumption and per capita income with/without considering labour movement 























 b  
(RMB) 
  S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run  L-Run  S-Run  L-Run  S-Run  L-Run  S-Run L-Run S-Run  L-Run  S-Run  L-Run 
N_Eastern  297.59    276.10    6.49    6.02    11051.23    11426.95    11041.53  11413.47  577.31    928.14    12.60    20.25    18748.24    18133.26    18868.67    18241.83   
N_Munici  203.29    184.04    9.67    8.75    20036.96    20504.53    17996.49  18327.80  730.72    881.06    34.76    41.91    37995.43    36133.87    30714.01    29477.04   
N_Coastal  424.95    366.64    6.38    5.51    10214.85    10539.69    10228.69  10555.72  2640.84    3224.44    39.66    48.42    20618.26    20105.07    20281.74    19837.56   
C_Coastal  812.45    724.17    8.54    7.61    18684.63    19142.65    17331.99  17720.65  2026.39    2839.88    21.31    29.86    33673.33    32185.36    29940.93    28924.88   
S_Coastal  490.20    387.87    7.33    5.80    13171.31    13497.24    11659.81  11919.92  2309.52    2831.49    34.51    42.32    25702.99    24820.67    20572.64    20047.55   
Central  535.89    453.04    5.15    4.35    6357.23    6584.04    6643.05  6890.88  1604.53    2719.71    15.41    26.11    11505.33    11254.54    12538.75    12172.33   
N_Western  159.02    138.67    5.34    4.66    6125.56    6321.58    6045.06  6238.57  771.76    1051.16    25.92    35.31    11516.03    11181.86    11353.26    11099.44   
S_Western  221.15    188.93    3.95    3.38    5000.68    5190.83    5193.33  5395.56  241.63    917.54    4.32    16.40    8844.27    8609.08    9565.59    9263.33   
Notes: S-Run stands for short-run simulation; L-Run stands for long-run simulation. 
a Labour movement not considered. 
b  Labour  movement  considered.        
Source: Simulation results. 
 
 
Table 11. Regional GINI coefficient with/without consideration of inter-regional labour movement   
Baseline in 2002  WTO  Full Economic Structural and Development 
No Consideration of 
Labour Movement 
Consideration of Labour 
Movement 
No Consideration of 
Labour Movement 
Consideration of Labour 
Movement 




Movement  S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run S-Run L-Run 
All  0.310935  0.281246  0.311286 0.308682 0.284635 0.281251 0.316587 0.311986  0.26855  0.267544 
N_Eastern  0.09875  0.092077  0.100349 0.101856 0.093809 0.094923 0.060516 0.059878 0.054799 0.055271 
N_Munici  0.025707  0.002891  0.000276 0.002465 0.017459 0.016579 0.034728 0.038819 0.011938 0.009983 
N_Coastal  0.061036  0.060173  0.072986 0.072287 0.071673 0.071039 0.093491 0.092834 0.081729 0.081885 
C_Coastal  0.195252  0.158334  0.184675 0.182767 0.150435 0.147143 0.175569 0.171494 0.120679 0.121565 
S_Coastal  0.137983  0.115887  0.146586 0.143717 0.127519 0.127803 0.141905 0.140123  0.13113  0.12914 
Central  0.068304  0.065805  0.071821 0.071518  0.06745  0.066942  0.07772  0.078409 0.060792 0.061918 
N_Western  0.112083  0.100102  0.103143 0.103076 0.093255 0.093018 0.113201 0.114811 0.105446 0.108636 
S_Western  0.104282  0.104292  0.10908  0.109201 0.113026 0.113442 0.128262 0.123075 0.126765 0.122658 
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Figure 7. Inter-regional labour movement under long-run full economic structure and development shock. 
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